Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive
System in Need of Rehabilitation
Jeffrey K Day*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Washington's juvenile justice system abandoned the rehabilitation or "best interests" model of juvenile justice in 1977 in
favor of an offense-based, "just deserts" model focusing on
punishment and accountability. At the heart of this latter
model is a determinate sentencing scheme that bases juvenile
sentences on the offense committed rather than on the needs
of the offender. However, the increase in the seriousness of
juvenile crime, the cost of maintaining the current system, and
the increasing population in juvenile corrections facilities all
demonstrate that the system is failing.
Throughout history, juvenile justice philosophy has been a
pendulum swinging from one extreme to the other. Originally,
juveniles were treated as adults and incarcerated in adult jails.
With the Progressive Movement' came one swing of the pendulum, and the juvenile justice system fully embraced a rehabilitative ideal.
In Washington, the public ultimately grew disenchanted
with trying to rehabilitate young offenders, and the pendulum
swung the other way. The punitive model was embraced and
rehabilitation was almost totally excluded. Now that Washington's strict punishment model has failed, policy makers and
the public seek yet another change.
Thus, history appears to indicate that embracing either the
punitive or the rehabilitative model to the exclusion of the
other simply invites failure and a return to the other extreme,
a return that only perpetuates the ultimate failure of the sys* B.A. 1979, University of Washington; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Puget
Sound School of Law. My thanks to Professors Pat Shelledy and Janet Ainsworth for
their assistance and encouragement during the preparation of this Comment.
1. The Progressive Movement took place from approximately the last decade of
the nineteenth century until the 1920's. For more, see generally Barry C. Feld, The
Transformationof the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REv. 691 (1991); Charles M. McGee,
Measured Steps Toward Clarity and Balance in the Juvenile Justice System, 40 Juv. &
FAM.CT. J. 1 (1989).
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tem as a whole. Some commentators suggest that the juvenile
justice system is schizophrenic because it attempts to both punish and rehabilitate.2 Coupled with the failure to provide
juveniles with either effective treatment services or all of the
procedural safeguards enjoyed in the adult justice system, commentators conclude that juveniles receive the worst of both
systems.3 Therefore, they recommend that the juvenile system
should be scrapped.4
This Comment argues that the juvenile justice system
should be retained in theory, but that Washington's punitive
approach has failed and should be restructured to embrace a
system that focuses more on the needs of the offender than on
the results of the offense. The punitive system must be
replaced by laws that once again make rehabilitation a primary
goal, but that also provide juveniles with the procedural safeguards necessary to ensure survival in the system. This Comment proposes a significant restructuring of the current system
as a means of achieving that goal.
Section II reviews the general history of the juvenile court
in America from its progressive reform to the mandate of procedural due process safeguards in the mid-1960's. Section III
summarizes Washington's juvenile court history, identifies the
reasons for the radical change from a rehabilitative to a punitive system in 1977, and examines the function of the current
system. Examination of the juvenile system's statutory framework, decisions of the Washington Supreme Court characterizing the juvenile system, and empirical evidence of how the
system functions, all demonstrate that Washington has
embraced a strictly punitive system that has failed to achieve
the deterrent goals envisioned by its creators.
Accordingly, Section IV explores options for reform by
reviewing recommendations from professionals, underlying
rationales for punishment or treatment of juveniles, and
experiences of states that embrace a rehabilitation philosophy.
After examining those recommendations and experiences in
light of data that suggests a strong correlation between juvenile crime and the existence of socioeconomic factors in
juveniles' lives, this Comment concludes that adoption of a
more therapeutic model of juvenile justice involving smaller
2. See infra notes 179, 254-259 and accompanying text.

3. See in~fra note 35 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 380-81 and accompanying text.
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facilities, greater judicial discretion, and a more indeterminate
sentencing structure will be cost effective while continuing to
protect the public. Finally, Section V makes specific recommendations for restructuring Washington's system to incorporate a rehabilitative justice model fairly and effectively.
Adopting a treatment-oriented approach is preferable to
eliminating the juvenile justice system as a separate entity.
However, in order for the changes recommended in this Comment to succeed, the state must provide sufficient funding for
the juvenile system. Alternatively, if the state is unwilling to
sufficiently fund adequate and effective treatment and aftercare services, the state should acknowledge that the juvenile
system is essentially a mirror image of the punitive adult system, and the state should afford juveniles all procedural due
process rights afforded to adults.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

A.

The ProgressiveJuvenile Court

To understand Washington's current juvenile justice system and the changes proposed in this Comment, the history of
juvenile justice in the United States must be briefly examined.
American society's early treatment of juveniles was marked by
punishment and retribution. In the early 1800's, young
criminals were treated similarly to adults, and they were subjected to adult punishments including banishment, whippings,
and public humiliation.' Some juveniles were incarcerated in
adult jails or penitentiaries.'
By the end of the nineteenth century, society experienced
increased modernization, urbanization, and immigration.
America had changed from an agrarian society to an urban,
industrial society. With growth came many social problems.
In reaction, a "Progressive" reform movement developed to
search for solutions.7
Child-centered themes were at the heart of many Progressive reforms. These reforms included child labor and welfare
laws, compulsory school attendance, and the juvenile court 8
Of all the Progressive reforms, creation of a separate juvenile
5.
6.
7.
8.

McGee, supra note 1, at 4.
Id.
Feld, supra note 1, at 693.
Id. at 694.
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court system remains the most controversial.'
Changes in basic assumptions about both the causes of
crime and the nature of childhood inspired Progressive criminal justice reforms. Children were no longer seen as miniature
adults, but as dependent, innocent individuals who needed
extended guidance and preparation for later life. 10 Positivist
criminology regarded crime as determined, rather than chosen,
and focused on reforming offenders rather than punishing
them for their offenses."
The Progressive "child savers" saw juvenile courts as
"benign, non-punitive, and therapeutic.' 1 2 The juvenile court's
jurisdiction allowed judges to reinforce parental authority.
Progressives felt that a juvenile court judge should be a "wise
and merciful father" and discipline juveniles as he would his
own children whose errors had not been discovered by authorities.' 3 Thus, the concept of parens patriae,the state as parent,
became the basis for court intervention. The proper role of the
court, according to early juvenile court proponents, was to go
beyond simply asking whether a child had committed an
offense. Instead, the court should ask what made the child
who he or she was physically, mentally, and morally. If the
judge learned what led to the criminal offense, the judge
should take charge of the juvenile, not to punish, but to
4
reform.

1

The juvenile court under the Progressives was an entirely
new way of responding to delinquents. 5 The juvenile court's
exercise of parenspatriae power was designed to avoid "branding" a juvenile with the life-long stigma of criminality.' 6 The
nature of juvenile proceedings was therapeutic and rehabilitation was the ultimate goal.
To achieve its rehabilitative goals, the court's focus was
not on the offense, but on the juvenile's character and lifestyle,
9. DAVID RoTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205 (1980) (providing a general overview of

the Progressive era juvenile court).
10. Feld, supra note 1, at 694.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
14. Id.
15. The first formal juvenile court opened in Chicago in 1899. Ten states had
similar courts within five years, and, by 1920, all but three states provided a juvenile
court. RoTHMAN, supra note 9, at 215.

16. Mack, supra note 13, at 109.
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psychological strengths and weaknesses, and the advantages or
disadvantages of home life. 7 The court's purpose was to look
deep into a delinquent's soul rather than criminally prosecute
him or her. Therefore, advocates of the juvenile court felt that
non-adversarial proceedings were instrumental to its operation.'" Courts adopted informal procedures and rejected the
traditional trappings of adult jurisprudence, such as juries and
lawyers.1 9 Proceedings were considered civil in nature, not
20
criminal.
The judicial role was seen uniquely in a juvenile court setting. As Cook County Juvenile Court Judge Julian Mack
observed, a judge "must be able to understand the boys' point
of view and ideas of justice; he must be willing and patient
enough to search out the underlying causes of the trouble and
to formulate the plan by which, through the cooperation,
oft21
times, of many agencies, the cure may be effected."
Even the physical characteristics of the juvenile court
varied from the adult system. Judges sat next to the juveniles,
believing that physical intimacy would promote insightful and
sympathetic treatment.2 2 The child was to be "made to know
that he is face-to-face with the power of the State, but he
should at the same time . . . be made to feel that he is the
object of its care and solicitude."'2
A key component of the rehabilitative model was indeterminate dispositions. In theory, disposition of a juvenile delinquent was to be guided by what was in the juvenile's best
interests. Because delinquent behavior was seen as a "symptom" of a child's real needs, "sentences were indeterminate,
non-proportional, and potentially continued for the duration of
minority. '2 4 While probation was considered the most important component of the juvenile court program, reformers were
prepared to incarcerate offenders.25 "Institutionalization was a
fully legitimate response, an integral part of the rehabilitative
program. ' 26 The unanswered question in the early 1900's was
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 215.
Mack, supra note 13, at 120.
Feld, supra note 1, at 695.
Id.
Mack, supra note 13, at 119.

22. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 217.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Mack, supra note 13, at 120.
Feld, supra note 1, at 695.
ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 218-19.
Id.
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where juveniles should be housedY It was not long before
states began constructing large state schools to house delinquents away from adult offenders.'
The Progressive reformers had fashioned a paternalistic
system that appeared to please everyone, because the system
was simultaneously benevolent and tough minded, helpful and
rigorous, protective of the child, and mindful of the safety of
the community. 9 However, the new court was not without its
detractors, and some lawyers and legal scholars objected to the
court's discretionary powers on the basis of civil libertarian
reasons.30 Legal challenges to the constitutionality of the juvenile courts were largely rejected.3 ' It was not until the mid1960's that those constitutional concerns triggered a fundamental change in juvenile courts.
B.

The Impact of Gault

The legal system's view of juveniles was forever changed
32
by the United States Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault
and a handful of contemporary decisions. Because Washington's sweeping change was initiated, in large part, by the rights
bestowed on juveniles through these rulings, it is necessary to
explore them in some detail.
Judicial dissatisfaction with the supposed benefits of the
juvenile court system became evident in 1966 when the
Supreme Court ruled in Kent v. United States3 3 that due process safeguards were required in the waiver of a juvenile to
adult court. Justice Fortas noted increasing evidence that,
27. Id. at 220-21. Chicago's juvenile court judge Richard Tuthill found that the
only existing facility for delinquents was no better than a prison, and that it was so
overcrowded that boys often remained too short a time for rehabilitation. Id.
28. Id. at 221. The Illinois State School, one of the earliest juvenile facilities,
opened in 1904.
29. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 224. For more on the parens patriae court, see
Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reforym: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187 (1970).
30. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 231. In 1914, Pennsylvania lawyer Edward Lindsey
accused the juvenile courts of exhibiting an entire disregard of established legal
principles and that, in the name of social betterment, the courts were surrendering
their traditional allegiance to the "right of the minor to his liberty as against the state,
except after conviction of crime." Id. Lindsey felt that all criminal questions should
be dealt with in a criminal court and that children should not be deprived of their
liberty unless formally convicted by traditional judicial principles. Id.
31. Id. at 232.
32. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
33. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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while laudable in its original goals, the paternalistic juvenile
courts lacked personnel, facilities, and techniques to perform
adequately as representatives of the state in a parens patriae
capacity.34 Consequently, Justice Fortas concluded that a juvenile experienced the worst of both worlds because he or she
received neither the protections provided to adults, nor the
care and treatment necessary for juveniles. 5
Following soon after Kent was In re Gault,'a which created
a new concept of a juvenile court system that was far removed
from the juvenile court envisioned by the Progressives. The
case concerned fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault who allegedly
phoned a neighbor and made lewd and indecent remarks. 7
The police arrested Gerald but did not notify his parents.3 a
After a series of hearings during which no record was kept, no
witnesses were sworn in to give testimony, and no lawyer was
provided to Gerald or his family, the juvenile court committed
him as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School
until age twenty-one or until discharged. 39 Had Gault been an
adult, the law that he allegedly violated would have resulted in
a fine of five to fifty dollars or imprisonment of not more than
two months.40
The United States Supreme Court, in a critical review of
juvenile court history, concluded that the results of the Progessive reform effort had "not been entirely satisfactory," and
that "unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated,
was frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. ' '4 ' The Court focused on the ultimate practical effect of a
juvenile court disposition and stated that whether called a
"receiving home" or an "industrial school," the end result was
that a juvenile was deprived of liberty and housed in a world of
guards, custodians, state employees, and other delinquents.'
The Court reversed the decision from below and gave
34. Id. at 555.

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 556.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.

39. Id. at 7.

40. Id. at 8-9.
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-20 (noting that due process was the indispensable
foundation of individual freedom, Justice Fortas stated that the failure to observe due
process resulted in unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of
fact).
42. Id. at 27.
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juveniles a series of due process rights. It then declared that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is
for adults alone. ' 43 Finally, the Court stated that juveniles
have the right to notice of the charges against them," to
appointment of counsel, 45 to confront and cross examine wit-

nesses,4 and to be advised of the privilege against selfincrimination.4 7
In addition to the mandatory procedural safeguards
imposed in In re Gault, the Court's other contemporary decisions give juveniles additional rights. The Court requires that
the state prove delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt, 48 and
that the Constitution's double jeopardy clause prohibits adult
criminal reprosecution of a juvenile who was previously convicted on the same charges in juvenile court.49 However, while
the Court took substantial strides to provide juveniles with
fundamental procedural rights given adult criminal defendants, the Court stopped short of providing the full range of
rights when it denied juveniles the right to a jury trial.'

III.

WASHINGTON'S JUVENILE JUSTICE HISTORY

A.

From Benevolence to Retribution

Washington's early juvenile justice system and its current
system represent distinct and contrasting approaches. This
section reviews the origin of Washington's juvenile justice system and the developments on the national and the state levels
that influenced state legislators to adopt the current punitive
system. The operation of the current juvenile justice system is
then examined in-depth.
43. Id. at 13.
44. Id. at 33.
45. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. The Court required that both the child and parents
be notified of the juvenile's right to be represented by counsel and that, if they could
not afford a lawyer, counsel would be appointed. Id.
46. Id. at 57.
47. Id. at 55.
48. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
49. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
50. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). The Court felt that jury
trials would disrupt the traditional juvenile court and its practices even though the
Court had largely changed those practices in previous rulings. Id. at 547. While the
Court acknowledged fault with the juvenile system, the Court contended that a jury
trial would not correct those flaws but would, instead, make the process unduly formal
and adversarial. Id. at 545. The Court noted that an ideal juvenile court system was
one that provided an intimate, informal, protective proceeding, yet the Court also
acknowledged that the ideal was seldom, if ever, realized. Id. at 545-47.
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Washington adopted legislation in 1905 and 1909 that created a separate juvenile court.5 1 In 1913, the legislature
enacted laws that remained largely unchanged until 1977.52
The 1913 Act followed the tradition of socialized justice for
juveniles. The purpose of the 1913 Act was to provide care,
custody, and discipline for a juvenile that approximated a level
of care that should be given by the juvenile's parents. 53 Courts
were given authority to intervene in the lives of juveniles,
including status offenders who were found to be either delinquent or dependent. 54
In addition to the changes implemented as a result of the
Supreme Court's decisions, the impetus for change in the law
came from several sources. At the federal level, Congress
enacted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
of 1974. 55 The 1974 Act provided financial incentives to states
to remove status offenders from the traditional juvenile court
system into community-based, non-secure facilities.'
The juvenile crime rate in Washington also began climbing
in the 1960's, and admissions to the state's juvenile institutions
nearly doubled from 1960-1967.51 In 1969, to encourage communities to keep juveniles out of the state system, the legislature began providing subsidies to counties for development of
additional resources.' Unfortunately, while institution populations dropped, the subsidy resulted primarily in an increase
in probation officers and not the creation of community-based
resources. 59 The growing cost of the juvenile justice system
added even more incentive for legislative reform to provide a
51. Act of Feb. 15, 1905, ch. 18, § 3, 1905 Wash. Laws 34 (repealed 1909); Act of
Mar. 17, 1909, ch. 190, Wash. Laws 668 (repealed 1913).
52. Act of Mar. 22, 1913, ch. 160, 1913 Wash. Laws 520 (substantially repealed
1977).
53. Id,
54. Mary Kay Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code, 14 GONZ. L. REv.
289, 290-91 (1979). For an additional review of Washington juvenile court history prior
to the 1977 changes, see Bobbe Jean Ellis, Juvenile Court- The Legal Process as a
Rehabilitative Tool, 51 WASH. L. REV. 697 (1976); Lawrence R. Schwerin, The Juvenile
CourtRevolution in Washington, 44 WASH. L. REV. 421 (1969).
55. Pub. L. No. 93-415, tit. I, § 101, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974) [hereinafter "1974 Act"].
56. Becker, supra note 54, at 293.
57. Id. Admissions climbed from 873 in 1960 to 1,539 in 1967. Id. This was
attributed, in part, to the fact that while counties paid for court costs to handle
juveniles, post-disposition costs were paid by the state. Id. at 293-94. Thus, counties
had an incentive to inject juveniles into the state system.
58. Act of April 24, 1969, ch. 165, 1969 Wash. Laws 1165.
59. Becker, supra note 54, at 294.
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predictable method of controlling access to state institutions.6°
Law enforcement officers and community groups also
called for change because they were dissatisfied by what they
viewed as insensitivity on the part of the juvenile courts
toward public safety and protection.6 1 These groups felt that
many juvenile dispositions were disproportionate to the crimes
committed and did not serve the juvenile's best interests; some
consequences were too severe for the offense, while others
were too lenient.6 2
As the legislature struggled to rewrite the juvenile laws, it
faced three major criticisms of the juvenile justice system: (1)
that the system was not accountable to citizens; (2) that the
system did not hold youthful offenders accountable; and (3)
that the system did not help offenders because the conflict
between punishment and rehabilitative roles undermined probation workers' and institutional officers' ability to work with
juveniles. 63 The increase in juvenile crime was noted as evidence of the juvenile justice system's ineffectiveness. 4
While the legislature evaluated alternatives to Washington's system, the Institute of Judicial Administration (IJA), in
conjunction with the American Bar Association (ABA), was
completing a Juvenile Justice Standards Project.' The Standards' authors believed that the traditional juvenile justice system was marred by confused concepts, grandiose goals, and
unrealized dreams.66 They contended that juvenile corrections

authorities and rehabilitation specialists did not demonstrate
the ability to effectively deal with adolescent behavioral
problems in coercive treatment programs.6 7
The IJA-ABA Standards rejected the traditional benevolent attitude of courts toward juveniles.' Rather than focusing
on a juvenile's needs, the underlying principle became proportionality in sanctions based on the seriousness of the offense.
Abolition of indeterminate sentencing was recommended in
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Becker, supra note 54, at 299.

INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1977) [hereinafter
IJA-ABA STANDARDS].
66. Id. at 27.

67. Id. at 32.
68. Id. at 23.
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favor of determinate sentences based on the fundamental
premise that court-ordered treatment was not inherently beneficial to juveniles.6 9 The authors lauded their standards as bold
and innovative.7
The IJA-ABA Standards established a "matrix consisting
of classes of offenses and the types of sanctions which a court
could impose in delinquency cases."' 71 Offenses were categorized into five classes based on the seriousness of the offense.
Sanctions ranged from custodial confinement in secure or nonsecure settings to conditional freedom, including probation and
restitution, and to nominal sanctions, including reprimands
and warnings. 72 The most serious sanction that could be
imposed for the most serious crime was twenty-four months of
confinement or thirty-six months of conditional freedom.7"
The IJA-ABA Standards were particularly attractive to
Washington legislators who sought a process that would make
juveniles more accountable for their crimes, provide predictability in the disposition process, and respond to concerns
about public safety. Legislative proponents for change
embraced the philosophy of a determinate sentencing
scheme.7 4
The ultimate legislative proposal found bipartisan support.
Law enforcement officials supported the proposal because it
included tougher and more consistent determinate sentencing
provisions, which would supposedly deter and incapacitate serious offenders.7 5 Public defenders and civil libertarians
applauded the bill's due process guarantees.7 6 Some juvenile
court judges, directors, and probation workers opposed the
bill.77 Ultimately, however, the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977
was passed and became effective January 1, 1978.78
69. Id. at 22 (noting that indeterminate sentences allow wide disparity in
punishment received for the same misconduct and create a potential for abuse that the
public is helpless to prevent).
70. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 65, at 191.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 192-94.
73. Id.
74. Becker, supra note 54, at 301.
75. Id. at 305.
76. ML
77. Id,
78. 1977 Wash. Laws ch. 291 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 13.40 (West
1992)).
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The "New" Washington Juvenile Justice System

This section examines key provisions of the current law
including the legislative intent of the Juvenile Justice Act of
1977 and the procedural rights afforded to juveniles. This section urges that the sentencing provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, which focus almost exclusively on making the
punishment fit the crime rather than addressing the juvenile's
individualized needs, clearly demonstrate that the system is
punitive.
The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 7 has been called many
things from radical and comprehensive,' to idealistic and
exciting,"' to the "most substantial reform of a state juvenile
code that has occurred anywhere in the United States." 2
Under the Act, the juvenile court, in a move away from the
parens patriaedoctrine, views itself as an instrument of justice
rather than as a provider of services.8 3 The legislative intent
expressed in the Act states that juveniles should, first and
foremost, be held accountable for their offenses.8 4 Prosecutors
welcomed the new system because it was predictable and
because it recognized that juvenile crime was a serious public
safety problem.8 5
Among the changes made by the Act was the provision of
counsel for juveniles who faced danger of confinement.8 The
Act rejects the concept that closed hearings are necessary for
rehabilitation of juveniles, and the Act specifically allows the
public and press to attend any hearing unless the court, for
79. Hereinafter the "Act".
80. Thomas C. Castellano, The Justice Model in the Juvenile Justice System:
Washington State's Experience, 8 LAW & POL'Y 479, 479 (1986).
81. WASHINGTON STATE

JUVENILE DISPOSITION

STANDARDS

COMMISSION,

23
(Revised June 1988) [hereinafter DISPOSITION STANDARDS GUIDE].
82. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1106 n.140
(1991).
83. Becker, supra note 54, at 308.
84. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West 1992) (setting forth additional
purposes of the 1977 Act).
85. Jay A. Reich, The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977: A Prosecutor'sPerspective, 14
GONZ. L. REV. 337, 346 (1979).
86. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(2) (West 1992). Unless waived, counsel
must be provided to juveniles who are financially unable to pay, and a juvenile may
not be deprived of counsel because a parent or guardian refuses to pay for legal
assistance. A juvenile also has a right to appointment of necessary experts. Id.
§ 13.40.140(3).
WASHINGTON

STATE JUVENILE

DISPOSITION STANDARDS PHILOSOPHY

AND GUIDE
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good cause, orders a hearing to be closed.8 7 Similarly, the legal
files of juveniles are open for public inspection." A juvenile
has the same right against self-incrimination as an adult, and
illegally seized evidence is inadmissible to prove guilt if such
evidence could not be admitted in an adult proceeding.8 9
When a juvenile is initially taken into custody, the court
must provide a detention hearing within seventy-two hours to
determine whether continued detention is necessary.' A juvenile may not be housed in an adult correctional facility except
in extraordinary circumstances. 9' Another mandatory hearing,
in cases where serious crimes are alleged, is a declination hearing where the court must determine whether the juvenile
should be prosecuted as an adult.9 2
Complaints to the juvenile court that allege the commis93
sion of an offense must be referred directly to the prosecutor.
If the alleged facts bring the case within jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, and if, on the basis of available evidence, probable cause exists to believe the juvenile committed the alleged
offense, the prosecutor must file an information in juvenile
court or divert the case. 94 The filing of an information is
87. Id. § 13.40.140(6).
88. Id. § 13.50.050(2).
89. Id. § 13.40.140(8). The law also requires waiver of any rights to be express
waivers intelligently made by a juvenile after being fully informed of legal rights. Id.
§ 13.40.140(9).
90. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.050(1)(b) (West 1992).
91. Id. § 13.04.116. A juvenile may be housed in an adult facility for up to twentyfour hours where the purpose for detention is an initial court appearance and where
there is no juvenile detention facility available in the county.
92. Id. § 13.40.110. Though hearings may be requested under any circumstances,
hearings are required where the accused is fifteen years of age or older and is alleged
to have committed a class A felony or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit
a class A felony or where the accused is seventeen years old and the alleged offense is
serious. Id. After a hearing, the court may order the case transferred to adult court if
it finds it would be in the best interest of the juvenile or public. Id. § 13.40.110(2). The
factors to be considered in a declination hearing are those outlined by the United
States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), and factual
determinations need be made only by a preponderance of the evidence. State v.
Toomey, 38 Wash. App. 831, 690 P.2d 1175 (1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1067 (1985). If
declined, the juvenile remains under adult criminal jurisdiction for all future offenses.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.020(10) (West 1992). For a comparison of other aspects
of the current law and prior law, see Richard G. Patrick & Timothy T.A. Jensen,
Changes in Rights and Proceedings in Juvenile Offense Proceedings,14 GONZ. L. REV.
313 (1979).
93. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.070(1) (West 1992).
94. Id. § 13.40.070(3). When a case is "diverted," the juvenile enters into a
diversionary agreement to fulfill certain conditions in lieu of being prosecuted. Id.
§ 13.40.080(1). Diversion agreements are limited to community service, restitution,
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required if the alleged offender is accused of a class A or B felony, other serious offenses, or if the offender has a serious
criminal history. 95
If the case is adjudicated, allegations must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 A juvenile is not entitled to a
jury trial.97 Following a delinquency finding,9' the court may
make a disposition immediately, or the court may order preparation of a pre-disposition report if the court determines that a
report would be helpful in the court's evaluation of the case.'
The disposition hearing has several procedural safeguards.
A juvenile and his or her counsel are allowed to examine and
controvert written reports and to cross-examine individuals
who wrote the reports.'0° The prosecutor and counsel for the
youth may submit recommendations.'
At the hearing, the
court must consider predisposition reports and arguments by
counsel, must allow statements by the juvenile and victim,
must determine whether the juvenile is a minor, middle, or
serious offender, and must consider mitigating and aggravating
factors.0 2 The punitive nature of the Act is shown, in part, by
the Act's prohibition on consideration of a juvenile's gender,
ethnic background, and social and economic background in
determining an appropriate disposition. 0 3 Further, only some
dispositions may be appealed.1°4
To guide dispositions, the legislature adopted the general
matrix sentencing concept of the IJA-ABA Standards. "The
presumptive sentencing scheme is intended to hold juveniles
accountable for crimes by dealing with them according to the
nature and frequency of criminal acts rather than on the basis
counseling, and fines of not more than $100. Id. § 13.40.080(2). Diversion agreements
may not exceed six months for a misdemeanor and no more than a year for a felony.
Id. § 13.40.080(4). The act for which the juvenile was diverted remains a part of the
juvenile's criminal history. Id. § 13.40.080(11).
95. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.070(5) (West 1992).
96. Id. § 13.40.130(6).
97. Id. § 13.04.021(2).
98. In juvenile court, a juvenile is found delinquent rather than not guilty, and an
order of the court finding a child delinquent is not to be considered conviction of a
crime. Id. § 13.04.240.
99. Id. § 13.40.130.
100. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.150(1) (West 1992).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 13.40.150(3).
103. Id. § 13.40.150(4).
104. Id. § 13.04.33. See also id. §§ 13.40.160, 13.40.230.
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of a juvenile's social background or need for treatment."'10 5
The legislative policy behind the 1977 Act is that serious
offenders are to be incarcerated as a matter of public safety.1°6
A Juvenile Disposition Standards Commission must periodically evaluate the effectiveness of existing disposition stan0
dards.0'
The Commission, by November 1 of each year, must
recommend to the legislature disposition standards for all
offenses.10 8 The standards establish ranges for confinement
and/or community supervision on the basis of a youth's age,
instant offense, and history and seriousness of previous
offenses. In no case is the period of confinement or supervision to exceed that to which an adult may be subjected to for
the same offense.' 0 9 In recommending standards, the Commission may only consider the length of confinement and not the
nature of security. The Commission may, however, consider
the impact that its proposed standards may have on the capacity of state juvenile institutions. 110 The legislature has also
imposed restrictions on the minimum term of confinement."'
The complicated process of determining a juvenile disposition begins with assessing the seriousness of the offense.
Offenses are divided into ten levels of seriousness and are then
designated a certain number of points." 2 As the age of the
juvenile declines, the number of points for the offense
decreases." 3 The juvenile's age at the time of the offense is
used in this calculation. 11 4 If there is a prior criminal history,
the current offense point total is then increased with the greatest increase resulting from prior offenses that are either more
serious or more recent. 1 5
105. Becker, supra note 54, at 308.
106. Id.
107. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.027(1) (West 1992).
108. DIVISION OF JUVENILE REHABILITATION, STATE OF WASHINGTON

JUVENILE

DISPOSrTON SENTENCING STANDARDS (effective July 1, 1989).
109. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.030(1) (West 1992).
110. Id. § 13.40.030(1)(a).
111. Id. § 13.40.030(2).
112. Id. § 13.40.0354.
113. For example, second degree malicious mischief is a class C offense. When
committed by a thirteen-year-old, it would result in forty points; however, when
committed by a seventeen-year-old it would carry fifty points. Id. § 13.40.0357.

114. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.0354(3) (West 1992).
115. Id. § 13.40.0354(2). Prior offense increase factors are determined by using the
time span and the offense category of the prior offenses. The "total" increase factor is
determined by totalling the increase factors of each prior offense and then adding a
constant 1.0. Id.
Continuing the example in supra note 113, if the juvenile had committed a B level
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Once a point total is determined based on the current
offense, age of the juvenile, and history of prior offenses, the
nature of the sentence and the sentencing range is chosen
based on whether the offender is classified as a serious
offender, 116 a middle offender, 117 or a minor/first offender." 8
If the court determines that a juvenile is a first offender,
the court may impose only up to one year of community supervision," 9 and/or up to one hundred fifty hours of community
service, 12 0 and/or a fine up to one hundred dollars. Confine1 22
ment 12 1 is not allowed.

If the court finds that the juvenile is a middle offender, it
has two options. Under option A, for an offense of up to one
hundred nine points, the court may impose up to twelve
months community supervision, and/or up to seventy-two
hours of community service, and/or up to a one hundred dollar
fine, and/or up to thirty days confinement. 12 Under option A,
for offenses more than one hundred nine points, only confinement is allowed. 2 1 Under option B, however, the court has the
discretion to impose up to one hundred fifty hours of community service in lieu of any confinement. 25
offense within the prior twelve months, the prior increase factor of 0.9 would be added

to 1.0 resulting in a total increase factor or 1.9. If the juvenile had committd the B
level offense more than two years prior to the current offense, the prior increase
factor would be 0.3 instead of 0.9.
To determine the "total" current offense points, the current offense points are
multiplied by the total prior offense increase modification factor. Thus, the thirteenyear-old with a current class C offense and a prior class B offense within one year
would have a total of seventy-six points (40 x 1.9). The seventeen-year-old under the

same circumstances would have ninety-five points (50 x. 1.9).
116. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.020(1) (West 1992) (defining
offender").
117. Id. § 13.40.020(13) (defining a "middle offender").
118. Id. § 13.30.020(14) (defining a "minor or first offender").
119. Id. § 13.40.020(3) (defining "community supervision").
120. Id. § 13.40.020(2) (defining "community service").
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.020(4) (defining "confinement").
122. Id. § 13.40.0357.
123. Id.
124. Id.

a "serious

125. Once again returning to the example in supra notes 113 and 115, the thirteen-

year-old, due to age and prior history, would probably be classified as a minor offender.
With seventy-six points, disposition would be limited to six to nine months community
supervision, and/or forty to fifty-six hours of community service, and/or a fine of up to
fifty dollars. The seventeen-year-old would be classified a middle offender for the

same offense history, and with ninety-five points, he or she could be sentenced to nine
to twelve months community supervision, and/or fifty-six to seventy-two hours
community service, and/or a fine up to one hundred dollars. Additionally, the

seventeen-year old could be confined for fifteen to thirty days.
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If the court finds that the juvenile is a serious offender, it
must sentence the juvenile to a term of confinement ranging
from eight to two hundred twenty-four weeks. 26 In any disposition involving confinement, due process and equal protection
guarantees require that a juvenile's detention time prior to disposition be credited against the maximum term of confinement
1 27
imposed under standard range guidelines.
Confinement and community supervision are not in any
way related to the time it may require a juvenile to successfully participate in a rehabilitation program. The sentence
given by the court is simply punishment based on the juvenile's age and offense history.
The judge has discretion in all dispositions to go outside
the sentencing guidelines only if the judge determines that the
terms of the disposition would create "manifest injustice" in
that the disposition would either impose an excessive penalty
on the juvenile or the disposition would impose a serious and
clear danger to society. 28 However, a juvenile's race, sex, or
social needs are not legitimate factors in determining if there is
manifest injustice.129
Where a disposition is imposed on a youth for two or more
offenses, the Act requires that the terms run consecutively
within specific limits;

30

another example of how the system

favors imposition of sentences based on the length of sentence
rather than the juvenile's treatment needs. A juvenile must be
confined in state institutions for juvenile offenders except
under limited exceptions that allow the transfer of juveniles to
adult correction facilities.' 3' A transfer may occur only if continued placement in a juvenile institution presents a continuing and serious threat to safety of others within the
institution.

32

126. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.0357 (West 1992).
127. In re Trambitas, 96 Wash. 2d 329, 332-34, 635 P.2d 122, 123-24 (1981).
128. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.160(1) (West 1992); see also id. § 13.40.020(12)
(defining "manifest injustice").
129. DISPOSITION STANDARDS GUIDE, supra note 81, at 14.

130. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.180 (West 1992). The total term may not
exceed three hundred percent of the term imposed for the most serious offense. Id.
§ 13.40.180(2). Community service may not exceed two years in length, and fines
assessed may not total more than $200 for all offenses. Id. § 13.40.180(3).
131. Id. § 13.40.280(1).
132. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.280(2) (West 1992). Assaults against juvenile
institution staff result in a mandatory hearing to consider transfer. Id. § 13.40.280(3).
If transferred to an adult institution, the juvenile can remain no longer than the term
imposed by the juvenile court. Id. § 13.40.280(5).
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Once a juvenile has been confined, a release date is set
within the prescribed range. 3 3 After completing the disposition and parole requirements, the juvenile is discharged from
state supervision. The state may retain control over a juvenile
who has been adjudicated under the juvenile court system
beyond the juvenile's eighteenth birthday in only limited circumstances.134 In no event may the juvenile be committed to
the state system past his or her twenty-first birthday.3 5
In 1977, legislators adopted the system just described primarily to hold juveniles accountable to the public for their
crimes. However, legislators, while giving juveniles some
important procedural rights, failed to give juveniles all the
rights inherent in the adult judicial system, most notably the
right to trial by jury. Legislators maintained that because the
juvenile system was civil in nature and designed to "treat"
rather than punish juveniles, it was not necessary to give
juveniles the full panoply of rights given to adults. However,
going beyond the plain language of the law to examine the
law's functional interpretation and enactment shows that little
difference remains between the adult and juvenile correctional
systems.

C. The Punitive Nature of Washington's Juvenile
Justice Act
To fashion a new system of juvenile justice on the assumption that the current system has failed, one must understand
the true nature of the current system and exactly how it has
failed. The primary goal of the Act is to hold a juvenile
accountable for his or her delinquent acts. However, is the Act
holding juveniles accountable to punish them or to rehabilitate
them? This Comment argues that the Act was implemented
solely to punish even though the courts and legislators continue to believe that the system provides both punishment and
treatment.
133. Id. § 13.40.210(1). The release date must be set before sixty percent of the
juvenile's minimum confinement term has elapsed. Id.
134. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.300(1) (West 1992). Juvenile court jurisdiction
beyond a juvenile's eighteenth birthday may occur only if, prior to the birthday, any of
the following conditions are met: (a) juvenile court proceedings are pending and the
court, in writing, extends jurisdiction over the youth beyond age eighteen; (b) the
juvenile was previously found guilty and an automatic extension is necessary to allow
for disposition; or (c) a disposition hearing was held and an automatic extension is
needed to allow for enforcement of the disposition order. Id.
135. Id.
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The plain language of the statutory framework just
reviewed is a starting point for understanding the true nature
of the current system. The views of the legislative authors, the
Washington Supreme Court, and the Commission charged with
establishing juvenile dispositions, further demonstrate that
punishment is the chief goal of the current system. In addition, the day-to-day operations of the current system convincingly demonstrate that it penalizes juveniles, makes virtually
no effort to rectify the causes of delinquency, and, ultimately,
increases a juvenile's delinquent behavior.
1.

The View of Legislative Authors

The legislature clearly intended in 1977 that juvenile justice in this state would take a radicaturn from the direction it
previously followed and that it would embrace a punitive system. One of the Act's prime sponsors noted that the law's
explicit language reflected a "movement away from a benevolent treatment model in that it makes clear that youngsters
who were being sentenced-i.e., deprived of liberty---are being
punished rather than treated."'" As an example, the word
"delinquent" was replaced by "offender."
Legislative sponsors noted that courts retained some,
albeit minimal, latitude to pursue rehabilitative goals under
provisions that allowed for counseling and other services as
part of the disposition of middle range offenders.' 3 7
2.

The View of the Washington Supreme Court

This section examines the Washington Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Act and how the court continues to view
the juvenile justice system as having dual goals of punishment
and rehabilitation.
The Washington Supreme Court views the Act as abandoning the doctrine of parens patriae as the guiding principle
and replacing it with the twin principles of rehabilitation and
3 8 In the court's view, there
punishment."
are two policies
underlying the Act. The first goal is to establish a system
136. Becker, supra note 54, at 308. See also GOVERNOR'S JUVENILE JUSTICE
ADVISORY CoMmrirEE, JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT 34 (1991) (recognizing that the
Juvenile Justice Act places primary emphasis on the protection of society and on
holding juveniles accountable for their offenses) [hereinafter 1991 REPORT].
137. Becker, supra note 54, at 308.
138. In the Matter of Smiley, 96 Wash. 2d 950, 953, 640 P.2d 7, 8 (1982). See also
State v. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d 384, 391-93, 655 P.2d 1145, 1149-51 (1982).
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capable of having primary responsibility for, and responding to
the needs of, youthful offenders.1 9 The second goal is to hold
juveniles accountable for their offenses and to ensure that
communities and juvenile courts carry out their functions con140
sistent with this intent.

In a number of challenges, the court has continued to
interpret the Act as providing for both punishment and rehabilitation. 14 ' To demonstrate the rehabilitative nature of the
system, the court relies on the assumption that juveniles are
committed to institutions that are designed to best serve the
welfare of the child and society. 142 Thus, in the court's view,
while the legislators changed the philosophy of addressing
juvenile offenders, they did not convert the procedure into a
criminal offense atmosphere completely comparable to an
143
adult criminal offense scenario.
In comparing the adult criminal system to the juvenile justice system, the court has noted a "critical distinction" in that
the statutory framework of the adult system does not recognize the express policy of "responding to the needs of offenders," a directive that is expressly recognized in the juvenile
system and one that the court says is of considerable significance.'" Based on this distinction, the court has held that the
Act did not abandon the rehabilitative ideal. 4 5 Rather, it has
stated as follows: "It does not embrace a purely punitive or
retributive philosophy. Instead, it attempts to tread an equatorial line somewhere midway between the poles of rehabilitation and retribution."

46

Ten years after passage of the Act, the court denied a juvenile the right to a jury trial, and the court continues to believe
that Washington's juvenile justice system retains a "unique,
139. Tommy P. v. Board of Commissioners, 97 Wash. 2d 385, 397-98, 645 P.2d 697,
703-04 (1982).
140. Id.

141. State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979)(finding that the Act's
rehabilitation function was evidenced by provisions for treatment, counseling, and
community supervision).

142. Id. at 658, 591 P.2d at 773.
143. Id. at 659, 591 P.2d at 774. See also State v. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d 384, 391, 655
P.2d 1145, 1150 (1982) ("it would be a mistake to assume that the new legislation has
turned completely from the ideal of rehabilitating juvenile offenders").

144. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d at 392-93, 655 P. 2d at 1150 (stating that this directive
"clearly indicates that the juvenile system is to some extent geared to respond to the
needs of the child").

145. Id. at 393, 655 P.2d at 1150-51.
146. Id.
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rehabilitative nature.' 1 47 While the Washington
Court views the juvenile justice system as balanced
rehabilitative and accountability goals, this view has
unanimous. In State v. Lawley,' 48 dissenting Justice
summarized his view of the law as follows:

Supreme
between
not been
Rosellini

In these provisions the legislature has made it clear that it is
no longer the primary aim of the juvenile justice system to
attend to the welfare of the offending child, but rather to
render him accountable for his acts, to
punish him, and to
1 49
serve society's demand for retribution.
Justice Rosellini emphasized that juveniles face a loss of liberty and exposure of their records to the public. 150 He found
that provisions for community service and consecutive
sentences related to punishment, and that punishment was no
longer geared to fit the needs of the child but, rather, was
related to the seriousness of the offense.'15 The system, he
declared, had been converted from one designed to protect and
rehabilitate the child to one designed to protect societal-purposes generally served by adult criminal law.
In 1987, Justice Goodloe wrote that:
[a]n open-minded comparison indicates that juvenile proceedings have become akin to adult criminal proceedings;
the Legislature and the courts of this State have so far
departed from a "rehabilitative" model of juvenile justice as
to render any differences from adult criminal justice too
minor to justify the withholding of the right to jury trial. 5 2
The reality of the law, he said, was that rehabilitation no
longer remained a substantial goal of the juvenile criminal justice system. The primary goal of Washington's system was condemnation, punishment, and deterrence.' 3

147. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 22, 743 P.2d 241, 250 (1987).
148. 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979).
149. Id. at 662, 591 P.2d at 775 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). See also Justice Dore's
dissent in Rice, 98 Wash. 2d at 404, 655 P.2d at 1155 (stating that the Juvenile Justice
Act shifts policy considerations from emphasis on rehabilitation to emphasis on
accountability, punishment, and the protection of society).
150. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d at 659, 591 P.2d at 775 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Schaff, 109 Wash. 2d at 23, 743 P.2d at 250-51 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 27-28, 743 P.2d at 253.
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The View of the Washington State Juvenile Disposition
Standards Commission

The punitive nature of the system is also demonstrated by
the philosophy adopted by the Washington State Juvenile
Disposition Standards Commission, a ten member panel
appointed by the Governor, charged with establishing and periodically reviewing juvenile sentencing guidelines. This section
explores (1) the general philosophy of the Commission toward
setting sentencing standards, (2) the model the Commission
has embraced to guide its recommended sentence decisions,
and (3) the conflict the Commission has created between punishing and treating juvenile offenders by adopting this model.
First, in its latest philosophy statement, the Commission
listed the sentencing standards goals to include the prescription of sentences that are fair, proportional, and predictable for
juveniles; provide public safety; promote individual youth
development; and require youth behavior accountability. 5 4 In
addition, the sentencing standards should ensure that the victims' rights are protected. 55
Although the Commission recognized that judicial discretion in dispositions should be allowed, it decided that discretion
should be limited such that it fell within consistent and predictable limits and would be clearly documented for meaningful review.'m
The Commission's values include the belief that detention
and institutional commitment should be reserved for more
serious offenders, juveniles who are the greatest threat to public safety, and repeat offenders.'5 7 In addition, the Commission
believes that as juveniles are processed through the juvenile
justice system, they should be treated as valued members of
the community. 5 "
The Commission also noted in its philosophy statement
that juvenile sentencing standards should consider a youth's
development and potential for change.' 5 9 However, the Commission prohibits basing sanctions on the youth's race, sex, economic status, or treatment needs.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

DISPOSITION STANDARDS GuiDE, supra note 81, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
DISPOSITION STANDARDS GUIDE, supra note 81, at 8.
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Finally, as to the imposed sanction, the Commission stated
that "[t]he first priority is to make the type and level of sanction ordered proportional to the youth's current and past
offense behavior.' 160 The proportionality epitomizes the punitive nature of the system because the sentence must first and
foremost punish the offense, not treat the offender.
Second, the Commission adopted a "Youth Justice Model"
comprised of three components to describe its goals and philosophy. 6 ' The first, and most important, component focuses on
accountability. According to the Commission, accountability is
expected of juveniles and justice is provided by the fair and
62
prompt imposition of sanctions upon youthful offenders.
The purpose of sanctions is to teach a lesson from which the
juvenile develops skills to prevent future offenses and the community obtains a long-term benefit. 163 Furthermore, the juvenile justice system should be responsible for "the use of
sanctions and treatment which research has shown to be
effective.""'
Another component focuses on community safety. The
Commission's philosophy, is that the severity, recency, and
number of past offenses are the best predictors of future
offenses. As a result, sentences should be more severe where
there is a prior offense history." The offender's past acts are
equally, if not more, important than the offender's recent acts
or the offender's special needs and circumstances.
A further component of the Commission's model focuses
on youth development and treatment, and it makes the
offender's age a key factor in disposition. In the Commission's
view, "the older the offender, the more accountable that
offender should be for the offensive behavior."'" "Sentencing
strategies and treatment services should consider that
juveniles can improve their behavior more easily than
adults."'167 Toward the goal of improved behavior, offenserelated treatment is believed to be an effective tool to reduce
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.

164. DISPOSITION STANDARDS GUIDE, supra note 81, at 12-13.

165. Id. at 13.
166. Id. at 15-16. Thus, the Commission reasons that there should be an increase
in sanctions with the juvenile's age even if the offense is identical. For example, see

supra notes 113, 115 and accompanying text.
167. DIsPosrroN STANDARDS GUIDE, supra note 81, at 15.
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recidivism.168 Although the Commission encourages such
169
treatment, it only does so within limits of the sanctions.
The Youth Justice Model typifies the punitive nature of
the system. Accountability, not rehabilitation, is the priority.
Prior offenses outweigh present needs. Age is the only personal characteristic considered in sentencing, and it is only
considered to the extent that the older a juvenile, the harsher
the sentence. All key components are aimed at enhancing
punishment, not at treating juveniles.
Third, and as a result of the Commission's goals and philosophy, it has created a conflict between treating and punishing offenders. While the Commission appears to support
treatment on one hand, it limits it with the other by declaring
that a sentence geared to the offender's treatment needs
undercuts the significance of the crime committed. It is the
Commission's philosophy that the need for treatment should
not influence the severity of sanctions, and that "educational
and treatment services should be considered only after sanctions have been developed.'1

70

A focus on the punitive rather than the rehabilitative
nature of the system is further demonstrated by the Commission's directive that if at the end of a sentence continued treatment is necessary, the sentence should not be extended.
Rather, the juvenile should simply be encouraged to continue
participation in a treatment program after his or her release.' 7 '
Thus, a juvenile is released regardless of whether rehabilitation has been achieved by some measurable means. One commentator has stated that "Washington's juvenile code, more
than any justice code in the nation, distinctly separates the
provision of social services for troubled youth from the consequences due when a juvenile breaks the law."' 72
In summary, the Washington State Disposition Standards
Commission recommends sentence ranges without considering
168. Id. at 16.

According to the Commission, juveniles should learn why

consequences occur and how to prevent the recurrence of offensive behavior. "The
Commission wishes to avoid a situation where sanctions are imposed without the
provision of effective services which focus upon preventing offense behavior ..
" Id.

at 17.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. DISPOSITION STANDARDS GUIDE, supra note 81, at 20.
172. Judith H. Ramseyer, Comment, The Court-Ordered Predisposition
Evaluation Under Washington's Juvenile Justice Act: A Violation of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination?,10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105, 113 (1986).
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special factors that may have influenced a juvenile's behavior.
In effect, the Commission's attitude is one of, "You do the
crime, you do the time." The obvious conclusion is that the
Commission's philosophy is punitive.
4.

The View of the System as Shown By Its Operations

If the explicit words of the Act's statutory framework and
the philosophy of the Commission leave any doubt as to the
almost entirely punitive nature of the system, the day-to-day
operation of juvenile facilities demonstrates the simple reality
that Washington's system has virtually no intent, desire, or
hope to rehabilitate. This section reviews the traditional
notion of what constitutes a proper juvenile facility and then
compares that idea to how Washington's juvenile facilities are
organized. Specific attention is given to the living conditions in
these facilities with a focus on lawsuits filed against the King
County Detention Facility and the Echo Glen Institution.
The traditional view of a rehabilitative juvenile institution
was one of a school as opposed to a prison. 73 Judge Julian
Mack wrote that, regardless of the length of institutional life, a
state should be required to furnish proper care:
This cannot be done in one great building, with a single dormitory for all of the two or three or four hundred or more
children, in which there will be no possibility of classification along the lines of age or degrees of delinquency, in
which there will be no individualized attention ....
Locks
and bars and other indicias of prisons must be avoided;
human love supplemented by human interest and vigilance
1 74
must replace them.
Judge Mack envisioned a system where juveniles would be
housed in a family atmosphere, where caretakers would be
more like benevolent parents, and where juveniles would be
grouped according to similarities in age, type of offense committed, and treatment needs.
Washington's juvenile justice facilities have not been faithful to Judge Mack's vision. Washington has eighteen countyoperated detention centers, eleven are located in western
Washington.'
The State Division of Juvenile Rehabilitation
operates five juvenile correctional institutions all of which are
173. Mack, supra note 13, at 114.
174. Id.
175. 1991 REPORT, supra note 136, at 37-8.
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located in western Washington. 1 76 Currently, no statewide
detention standards exist,177 a problem annually highlighted by
7
the Governor's Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee.
Conditions in Washington's juvenile institutions have been
a source of public and legal controversy. A 1987 report of conditions at the King County Detention Facility concluded that
the conflicting goals of punishing juveniles while trying to
rehabilitate them resulted in an environment that was "inconsistent, at times inhumane, and certainly one that undermines
staff and youth morale."' 7 9 Detention staff relied too heavily
on isolation and lock down as behavior management techniques, and education programs were found inadequate.' 0
In August 1990, a class-action lawsuit was filed claiming
that the King County Detention Center was unsafe, overcrowded, and unsanitary.'
The lawsuit alleged that overcrowding and meager staffing subjected juveniles at the center
to violence and psychological harm.8 2 The lawsuit requested
the hiring of more staff and prohibiting the sharing of single
176. Id. The Division of Juvenile Rehabilitation operates three medium to
maximum security institutions (Green Hill, Maple Lane, and Echo Glen) and two
medium security forestry camps (Mission Creek and Naselle). The Division also
administers five minimum security group homes.
177. An American Civil Liberties Union director for a local chapter notes that
"detention centers are not required to be inspected by a state fire marshal and that
sanitation and hygiene standards are nearly non-existent." Moreover, "counties have
resisted standards such as those set by national associations, in part, because they
could not afford the costs." Mary Rothschild, Locking Up the Young Is Opposed,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 19, 1990, at Al.

178. 1991 REPORT, supra note 136, at 23.
179. PAUL DEMURO ET AL., A REPORT TO THE KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
YOUTH SERVICES CONCERNING THE KING COUNTY DETENTION FACILITY 1 (1987). The

authors noted that deficiencies included the following. a lack of outdoor recreation
time, a lack of integration between probation and detention services, a view of inmates
as "objects," an inability of facility staff to perceive basic human needs of inmates as
important, and a lack of special educational, counseling, medical, or remedial services
in the Special Program Unit. Id. at 2-4, 7.
180. Id. at 19-20.
181. T.I. v. Delia, No. 90-2-16125-1 (King County Super. Ct. filed Aug. 10, 1990).
Among the unhealthy conditions alleged in the lawsuit were the following: mice
infestation, poor ventilation, lack of access to private toilets, poor educational
opportunities, and inadequate exercise.
182. Id. The ACLU publicly supported the suit by objecting to the use of holding
cells behind the King Country Courtroom alleging that, while designed to hold
juveniles a few hours while waiting for trial, the cells were being used to house
juveniles overnight. American Civil Liberties Union of Wash., Press Release, May 29,
1990 [hereinafter ACLU Press Release]. The ACLU complained that juveniles were
forced to urinate on the cell floor because staff either refused to let them out or were
not available to escort them to the bathroom. Id.
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cells by six residents. 8 3 The suit also asked that the number
of juveniles at the facility be limited to seventy-one, the
number for which it was built.'" The facility's administrator
admitted a preference to house no more than ninety juveniles
because the ability to control the population diminished when
18 5
the number of residents approached one hundred twenty.
Government reaction to the lawsuit demonstrated questionable dedication to the alleged rehabilitation goals of the
system. County officials vowed to fight the lawsuit that they
called an outrage and an insult to jail staff.8 6 Ultimately, a
judge prohibited the housing of more than two juveniles per
jail cell. 87 While acknowledging a two person limit might create logistical problems, the judge said that the "need for detention does not override the rights of children to be safe and
88
secure."
Serious problems in living conditions are not unique to the
facilities located in King County. A 1987 study of thirteen of
the state's eighteen detention facilities revealed that staff
training was below nationally recognized standards, and that
the physical plants of many facilities constituted hazards to the
life, safety, and health of staff and inmates." 9 Due to a lack of
programs and services, the study concluded that the detention
183. T.I. v. Delia, No. 90-2-16125-1 (King County Super. Ct. filed Aug. 10, 1990).
184. T.I. v. Delia, No. 90-2-16125-1 (King County Super. Ct. May 22, 1991) (motion
for injunction).
185. Barbara Clements, Youth Detention Center Safe, JOURNAL AMERICAN
(Bellevue, WA), Aug. 15, 1991, at A4.
186. Richard Seven, Hill Vows to Fight Juvenile Safety Suit, SEATTLE TIMES, May
24, 1991, at Cl. King County Executive Tim Hill alleged that the suit would force the
County to release dangerous juveniles into the community. Id. The ACLU countered
by stating that Hill's charges were designed to divert attention from the real issue of
juveniles being assaulted while in care of the County. ACLU Press Release, supra
note 182.
187. T.I. v. Delia, No. 90-2-16125-1 (King County Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1991)
(stipulation and order).
188. Bob Lane & Richard Seven, Judge Sets Limit at Two Youths Per Cell,
SEATTLE TmES, Aug. 16, 1991, at El. No limit was placed on the institution's capacity.
While the center had 143 beds, the order made only 112 usable. At the time of the
ruling, the center had 113 residents, but the population had peaked at 140 a few weeks
earlier. Don Carter, County Ordered to Cut Crowding at Youth Center, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Aug. 17, 1991, at Al.
189. CHARLES J. KEHOE & JOSEPH R. ROWAN, JUVENILE DETENTION IN
WASHINGTON STATE: STATE OF THE STATE REPORT 2-3 (Aug. 1987). Investigators also

found state officials reluctant to recommend physical plant standards. The report
noted an absence of any structured programming in many facilities and the lack of
funding for education programs as serious problems. Health care practices and
sanitation were found inadequate. Id. at 3-4.
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facilities were unable to provide any services beyond custodial
care.

19 0

These problems are not unique to county detention facilities; rather, they plague state-operated juvenile institutions as
well.' 91 Overcrowding is a problem at all of the state's juvenile
institutions.'9 2 This problem has been most visible at the Echo
Glen near Issaquah, Washington, where overcrowding has been
an issue for at least fifteen years. Although Echo Glen has
permanent beds for 176 inmates, in July 1991, the facility held
218 residents.' 9 3 In 1976, a complaint filed by state employees
charged that crowding at the facility "had reached such serious
proportions that the safety and welfare of both the staff and
inmates were in danger," and the state was ordered to reduce
inmate population in 1982." 9
With crowding again on the rise, staff more recently
claimed that the number of treatment and rehabilitation programs have been cut and that those provided are failing. 9 ' In
August 1991, the state was again ordered to reduce overcrowding at the Echo Glen facility."9
Suicides and attempted suicides are also grim proof of the
detrimental effects of incarceration in Washington's juvenile
system. In January 1992, a thirteen-year-old hung himself
while detained at Echo Glen. 19 Two months later, a fifteenyear-old boy attempted to hang himself at the Spokane County
Juvenile Detention Center, the second suicide attempt at that
center during the month. 9 ' Such self-destructive behavior
190. Id. at 4.
191. County-operated detention centers usually house juveniles who await court
hearings. In some instances, where sentences are short, detention centers may house
juveniles during their sentences. The state-operated institutions, however, are
specifically used to house juveniles who have been sentenced and who have usually
been given substantial confinement terms. These institutions are medium to
maximum security. 1991 REPORT, supra note 136, at 37.
192. Louis T. Corsaletti, Overcrowding at Echo Gle." New Urgency to Old
Lawsuit, SEATTLE TimES, July 16, 1991, at C1.
193. Id.
194. State Told It Must Have Plan to Cut Overcrowding at Echo Glen, SEATTLE
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1991, at A9.
195. Corsaletti, supra note 192, at C1.
196. State Told It Must Have Plan to Cut Overcrowding at Echo Glen, SEATTLE
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1991, at A9.
197. Youth 13, Dies After Hanging With Cord, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 11, 1992, at
A7.
198. Boy in Detention Tries to HangHimseV, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 23, 1992, at B5.
In addition, a sixteen-year-old at the center tried to hang himself earlier that month.
Id.
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raises serious questions both as to the effect of detention on
these juveniles and to the ability of staff to monitor inmate
activities.
Overcrowding, inmate assaults, violence, suicide, and the
lack of education, recreation, or counseling programs,"9 all
demonstrate that Washington's juvenile justice system has
abandoned any meaningful or effective concept of rehabilitation. In an effort, perhaps, to enhance the alleged rehabilitative prong of the Act's twin principles, the law was amended in
1989.2" The amendments created a structured residential program that would both benefit the community and juvenile
offenders by promoting "the offenders' personal development
and self-discipline, thereby making offenders more effective
participants in society."' 20 1 In 1992, the legislature also adopted
language stating that the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act
are to be considered equal.2 °2 However, the legislature made
virtually no substantive changes to the law, nor did it provide
funding to improve the system's operation.
Both the day-to-day operation of the juvenile justice system and the legislature's lack of action to change or improve
the system, unfortunately, exemplify the punitive nature of
the system. It is a system that offers juveniles minimal education and little or no counseling or training. It is a system that
exposes juveniles to violence and to others who, in many cases,
have committed substantially more serious offenses. It is a system that warehouses juveniles, a system that simply exists to
punish.
D.

The Failureof Washington's Punitive Justice System

The previous sections demonstrate that Washington's juvenile justice system is almost exclusively a punitive system.
This section argues that Washington's punitive system has
failed to remedy the problems inherent in the former system.
Legislators abandoned the traditional rehabilitation model of
juvenile justice in favor of the punitive model in the belief
such a change would accomplish specific objectives including
199. Task Force Study-Treatment is Lacking in State Juvenile System, SEATLE

TIMES, July 3, 1991, at A6 (noting that for much of 1990 and 1991 there was only only
one psychologist to serve the entire population of institutionalized youth).

200. Omnibus Alcohol and Controlled Substances Act, ch. 271, § 115, 1989 Wash.
Laws 1266, 1284.
201. WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 13.40.290(1) (West 1992).
202. Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, 1992 Wash Laws ch. 205, 886.
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(1) reducing the increasing cost of the juvenile justice system;
(2) reducing the rate of juvenile crime; (3) eliminating rehabilitation programs that were viewed as having failed to correct
delinquent behavior; and (4) eliminating the disproportionate
commitment of offenders where some serious offenders served
shorter periods than some minor offenders.
Fifteen years of experience with the punitive system demonstrates that this system and its philosophy has not worked
any better than its predecessor, and, in fact, may be accomplishing the exact opposite of its creators' objectives. The failure of punitive juvenile justice will be shown by demonstrating
the following: (1) that juvenile arrest rates continue to climb;
(2) that the number of juveniles referred to and detained in
juvenile facilities continues to rise; (3) that the juvenile detention rate in Washington is one of the nation's highest; (4) that
funding envisioned by the system's creators has not been provided; (5) that juvenile crimes are becoming more violent; and
(6) that juvenile recidivism rates have not improved.
First, the rate and number of juvenile arrests for serious
and violent crimes have continued to increase. Arrests for violent crimes rose from 3.5 per 1,000 in 1985 to 5.1 per 1,000 in
1990.203 Since 1981, the rate and number of juvenile arrests for
serious and violent crimes has more than tripled." 4 The overall juvenile arrest rate in 1990 was significantly higher than in
1981.2"5 Juveniles accounted for about forty percent of all violent crime arrests. 206 The fifteen- to seventeen-year-old age
group accounts for more property crime arrests than any other
age group, and the arrest rate of this age group for violent
crimes is more than double that of any other age group." 7
Second, the number of juveniles referred to and detained
in juvenile facilities continues to rise. In 1990, juvenile court
offense referrals totalled 72,517, a three percent increase over
1989 and an eight percent increase over 1988.208 Of that total,
203. 1991 REPORT, supra note 136, at 95.

204. Id.
205. Id. In 1981, there were 40,578 juvenile arrests at a rate of 74.9 per 1,000. In
1990, there were 45,535 juvenile arrests, the highest number recorded in ten years at a
rate of 87.1 per 1,000. The total number of arrests has ranged from about 39,000 to
45,500 between 1981 and 1990. Id.
206. 1991 REPORT, supra note 136, at 91. See also Young Guns: Robberies by

Teenagers on the Rise, SEATTLE TimES, Mar. 1, 1991, at Al.
207. GOVERNOR'S JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITrEE, JUVENILE JUSTICE
REPORT 87 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 REPORT].
208. 1991 REPORT, supra note 136, at 106-108. The majority of referrals,
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39,407 juvenile offenses were referred to prosecutors, a five
percent increase over 1989.2°9 Of that number, forty-eight percent were referred for diversion, thirty-one percent resulted in
filing of charges, and twenty-one percent saw no action. 1l
Third, Washington detains juveniles at a higher rate than
the national average. Prior to the 1977 Act, Washington
ranked seventh in the nation in detention rates.2 1 ' Two years
after its enactment, Washington climbed to fourth, and by
1982, Washington's detention rate was the third highest in the
country.2 1 2
One reason given for the high rate is the use of detention
facilities for sentenced juveniles, 1 3 whereas, normally, detention centers house juveniles who are awaiting hearings or sentencing. While the number of juveniles in detention facilities
dropped slightly from 1986 to 1988, the number of juveniles
detained has risen about ten percent annually since 1988.214
Increasing populations are not only evident in the state's
detention facilities, but in its residential programs as well. 1 5
Of the 876 juveniles in residential placements, on average, 656
were in state institutions, the highest average number since
1985, and 220 were in community residential placements such
as group and foster homes.2 6 Both placement types increased
from prior years, although institutional placement has grown
at a far faster rate than residential placement 2 1 7 Among the
approximately sixty-three percent in 1990, were for class D and E offenses, the least
serious while one percent of the referrals were for the most serious, class offenses. Id.
at 107.
209. Id. at 113.

210. Id. The rate of referrals for whom charges were filed increased by about
eight percent in 1990, while the rate of referrals of juveniles referred to diversion
increased four percent. Id.
211. Barry Krisberg et al., The Watershed of Juvenile Justice Reform, 32 CRIME &
DELINQ. 5, 24-25 (1986).

212. Id. In 1974, the detention incarceration rate was 54 per 100,000 age-eligible
youth. In 1979, the rate was 59 per 100,000. In 1982, the rate climbed to 94 per 100,000.
Id.
213. Krisberg et al., supra note 211, at 24.
214. 1991 REPORT, supra note 136, at 130. The number of juveniles held in
detention rose from 17,406 in 1986 to 18,662 in 1990. Id.
215. Id. at 135 (noting that the average daily population in
was 827 in 1990).

residential programs

216. Id.
217. 1991 REPORT, supra note 136, at 135-39. The average daily population (ADP)

in state institutions was 543 in 1988 and 620 in 1990. ADP in community residential
placements was 196 in 1988 and 206 in 1990. While the number of youth in state
institutions has continued to rise since 1988, the number of youth in community
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major concerns over substantial use of detention and institutionalization is the resulting disproportionate rate of minority
218
youth who are detained and placed in residential programs.
Higher placement rates may have resulted, in part, from a
reduced use of parole as a disposition alternative. The average
daily juvenile population on parole experienced a steady
decline from 1986 to 1989, but it then increased slightly in 1990
and 1991.219
Fourth, the adoption of a punitive system has not solved
the funding issues that helped motivate the system's adoption.
It has been estimated the state pays about forty-nine thousand
dollars per year for each institutionalized youth, and that the
remodeling of Green Hill School in Chehalis, one of the state's
juvenile institutions, would require sixty to ninety million dollars. 220

The State Director of Juvenile Rehabilitation notes

that budget allocations are preventing the hiring of any more
staff, and that where vacancies have occurred they have been
left vacant due to lack of money. 221 The punitive system has
not made juvenile justice cost-efficient.
Fifth, officials who run juvenile facilities note that the
nature of juvenile crime is far more violent than in the past.22 2
residential placements fell by about twenty percent between 1986 and 1990 then
jumped ten percent in 1991. Id.
218. While the cause of racial disproportionality in the juvenile justice system is
beyond the scope of this Comment, a few notes are in order. In 1990, minorities made
up 14.2 percent of the juvenile at-large population, but they represented 26.4 percent of
juveniles held in detention facilities. Id. at 29, 128. In residential facilities for the first
five months of 1991, 37 percent of the population was made up of African-American,
Native American, and Hispanic juveniles. Id. at 135. When compared to the ethnic
distribution within the state population, African-American youth were held in
detention at a rate six times their proportion of the population. 1990 REPORT, supra
note 207, at 121. Native American and Hispanic youth were held in detention at a rate
two times their proportion of the population. Id.
219. 1991 REPORT, supra note 136, at 140.
220. Juvenile Justice Not Working Here, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 26,
1990, at A10.
221. Corsaletti, supra note 192, at C1. See also Patti Epler, Parents Seek Tougher
Juvenile System, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, WA), Sept. 20, 1991, at A14
(according to legislators and others, juvenile justice system has never worked the way
it was envisioned mainly because it was never adequately funded); Patti Epler,
Growing Up Violent, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, WA), Sept. 15, 1991, at Al
(stating that the current juvenile code was never adequately funded) [hereinafter
Epler, Growing Up Violent].
222. Seven, supra note 186, at C1. See also Clements, supra note 186, at A4
(noting that youth facility manager acknowledges the number of rapists, robbers and
murders in facility is rising); Louis T. Corsaletti, Youth Center's Staff Swamped,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, at D3 (stating that Echo Glen, originally built to treat
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For example, in 1990, a fourteen-year-old boy was sentenced to
more than three years in juvenile detention after being found
guilty of shooting'22a3 man because the man looked at the boy
"the wrong way.

Sixth, recidivism of juvenile offenders remains high. Harold Delia, Director of King County's Department of Youth
Services, says the high rate of recidivism demonstrates that
simply being institutionalized for some period is not making an
impact.2 2 4
The failure of the current system to cost-effectively reduce
the severity and amount of juvenile crime prompted legislative
action. In 1991, state legislators appointed a twenty-nine-member task force to review the juvenile justice system.2 2 5 The
task force presented recommendations to the legislature in
January 1992.221 Of the many recommendations, legislators
proposed only those that would not incur significant costs. The
original legislation called for spending $55 million, but the legislature allowed only $1.2 million for juvenile justice reform.2 2 7
Of the few proposals made, most were vetoed because of a lack
of funding.22 Legislators also restructured and extended a
committee on juvenile issues, which is to report to the legislature by December 15, 1992, on further reforms to the Juvenile
Justice Act. 2 9
The legislature realizes that the juvenile justice system in
Washington is failing as demonstrated by the problems
detailed above. However, the legislature has failed to make
substantive proposals to change or fund a new and different
children with behavioral problems, now houses mostly hardened, violent juvenile
criminals).
223. Boy, 14, Receives 3-Year Sentence in Death of Man, SEAT7LE TIMES, Mar. 17,
1990, at A6.
224. Dave Birkland, Boot Camp Has Its Detractors,SEATTLE TmEs, Aug. 30, 1990,
at B2.
225. Act effective May 16, 1991, ch. 234, 1991 Wash. Laws 1166.
226. 1992 Legislative Package (as voted upon at the Dec. 16, 1991, Juvenile Issues
Task Force Meeting).
227. Stephanie Dunnewind, Children's Issues Stamped Null and Void, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 18, 1992, at B3.

228. L tter from Gov. Booth Gardner to the House of Representatives, State of
Washington (Apr. 2, 1992) (vetoing portions of H.B. 2466) [hereinafter Veto Letter]. In

his veto message, Governor Booth Gardner stated that many of the legislative
povisions were left unfunded with the burden of making tough choices left to the next
legislature. Governor Gardner stated, "I cannot mislead the citizens of the state into
believing HB 2466 [Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, ch. 205, 1992 Wash. Laws 886 will
make important and needed changes in the lives of youth." Id.
229. Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, ch. 205, 1992 Wash Laws 886.
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system. This failure may be a result of the task force's recommendation that the current punitive system be funded at a
higher level.
Because Washington faces a budget deficit, legislators are
understandably reluctant to pour additional funding dollars
into a system that is failing to reduce juvenile crime. Continued or additional funding of the current system is not the
answer. The answer is reform and the creation of a new
system.
IV.

THE OPTIONS FOR REFORM

Washington's "radical, innovative, and exciting" juvenile
justice system has failed to achieve the goals of its creators.
The question now is where to go from here. There is no lack
of suggested direction. Some favor retaining a punitive system,
while others call for a return to a treatment model. This section concludes that a treatment-oriented model of juvenile justice should be adopted. In arriving at that conclusion this
section examines the following information: (1) the preferences of those who work with the current system; (2) the differences between punishment and treatment approaches; (3)
the experience of states that embrace a treatment model; and
(4) the detailed arguments in favor of adopting a treatment-oriented model.
Those who work with the current system have strong
views about what works best. Those views were made known
to the 1991 Task Force on Juvenile Issues via nearly a dozen
public hearings statewide. 3 0 The Task Force found that judges
and juvenile court administrators generally favor retaining the
presumptive sentencing guidelines that are at the heart of the
Washington system.
Judges, however, desire four changes. First, judges believe
2 31
that the guidelines should provide wider sentencing ranges.
Second, judges want to be able to suspend or defer sentences in
order to provide greater latitude in dealing with individual
cases.2 3 2 Third, judges seek sentencing alternatives such as
230. Letter from Task Force on Juvenile Issues to Interested Persons (Nov. 26,
1991). More than 900 citizens attended ten public meetings and almost 300 of those
citizens offered testimony.
231. REPORT OF THE FAMILY AND JUVENILE LAW COMMITTEE TO THE SUPER.
COURT JUDGES' ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE LAW IN WASHINGTON 2 (Apr. 1991)
[hereinafter JUVENILE LAW REPORT].
232. Id.
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group homes and substance abuse treatment facilities 2 33
Judges believe that a court appearance to approve diversion
agreements would help to reinforce the message that the community will not tolerate criminal behavior, although judges
remain supportive of diversion for first-time offenders.Y
Court administrators agree that judges should have
greater sentencing alternatives.2 3 5 They also point out that
greater efforts should be concentrated earlier before a youth
becomes a multiple offender.23
Administrators recommend
that sentencing options include suspended and deferred
sentences and community-based placement, that dispositions
be guided according to what the best course of action would be
for the offender, and that sentencing models other than the
current point system be considered. 3 7
The King County Department of Youth Services favors
retention of both the diversion program and the presumptive
sentencing guidelines, but agrees that sentencing ranges need
to be broadened to provide more flexibility.23 8 In addition, a
revised juvenile justice system should both hold youth accountable and respond to treatment needs.2 3 9
Commentators on juvenile justice say that "it is an institution at a philisophical crossroads that cannot be resolved by
reference to simplistic treatment versus punishment formulation. ' 240 The adoption of one philosophy to the exclusion of
the other has not proved satisfactory in the past. There is no
reason to believe either extreme will solve juvenile crime
problems in the future. The first question that legislators must
address is whether the system should focus primarily on punishing or treating juveniles.
233. Id. at 3.
234. Id.
235. WASHINGTON ASSOCIATION OF JUVENILE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, REPORT ON
JUVENILE ISSUES 4 (June 1991).

236. Id. at 2.
237. Id. at 4-5.
238. KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE,
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT OF 1977 1-2 (July 1991). The
committee supports use of suspended and deferred sentences and expansion of the
definition of "confinement" to include placement in programs and facilities contracted
with by the county or state. Id. at 2.
239. Id. at 3.

240. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 910 (1988)
[hereinafter Feld, Principleof Offense].
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To Punish or Rehabilitate?

In order to understand how punishment and treatment
models might be synthesized, this section outlines the basic
characteristics of the punitive and rehabilitative models.
Although the punitive juvenile justice system has grown in
popularity, it will be shown that punitive systems elsewhere
suffer from the same problems inherent in the Washington
system. Further, it will be shown 'that some of the reasons
given for abandoning the rehabilitative model were insufficient
because little effort was made to rehabilitate juveniles.
Generally, punishment focuses on imposing sanctions in
order to retribute and deter, while treatment focuses on the
mental health, status, and welfare of an individual.2 4 ' Under
the punishment model, as adopted in Washington, sentences
are based on the characteristics of the offense and are determinate and proportional. In contrast, under the treatment model,
sentences are based on characteristics of the offender and are
open-ended, non-proportional, and indeterminate.
Proponents of the punishment or "just deserts" model
make several arguments in favor of a punitive system. They
argue that an indeterminate sentencing scheme gives "experts"
too much say, that experts are unable to justify treating similar
offenders differently based on objective indicators, and that
individualized sentences create inequalities and disparities in
sentencing.2 42 In addition, proponents of punitive juvenile justice contend that nothing else seems to work,24 3 that punishment is useful in preventing youthful crime, and that only
punitive justice can hold young offenders accountable.2 44
The treatment model, by contrast, focuses on determining
what caused criminal behavior and treating the symptoms.
The judicial inquiry is not on the juvenile's past behavior, but
on what future steps can be taken to alleviate the conditions
that led to the delinquent behavior. The treatment model
advocates indeterminate sentencing because the underlying
causes of delinquency are many and the length of required
241. Id. at 833.
242. Id. at 835-36.
243. See Theodore N. Ferdinand, History Overtakes the Juvenile Justice System,
37 CRIME & DELINQ. 204 (1991).

244. See generally Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on
Juveniles: The ChangingIdeology of Youth Corrections,5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 323 (1991); Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice: Some
Observations on a Recent Trend, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHOL. 129, 140 (1987).
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"rehabilitative" therapy cannot be predicted. States embracing
the treatment model typically give juvenile court judges broad
discretion to impose dispositions including dismissal, probation,
out-of-home placement, or institutional confinement.2 45 Often,
laws require judges to select the least restrictive alternative
available.2 4 6
The majority of indeterminate juvenile sentencing statutes
allow a sentence to run through the age of minority. 247 A
minority of indeterminate states adopt a statutory maximum
sentencing period, typically two years, during which the court
may assert its jurisdiction.248 In indeterminate sentencing
schemes, a decision to release a juvenile is based, in part, on
behavior during confinement and how much progress
a juve249
nile makes toward specific, individualized goals.
States have gone back and forth in use of the treatment
and punishment models, but the punitive model of juvenile
justice has grown in popularity. Professor Barry Feld recently
compared juvenile justice systems in the fifty states. 250 He
found that ten states had redefined the purpose of their juvenile justice system within the past decade, and that the role of
rehabilitation had been downplayed in favor of acknowledging
the importance of public safety, punishment, and individual
accountability. 251' Determinate sentencing schemes, like Washington's, are now used in about one-third of the states.2 5 2
The adoption of punitive systems in other states, however,
has brought some of the same problems that now plague Washington institutions. Feld noted that juveniles sentenced to long
terms under "get tough" laws tended to be the most serious
and chronic offenders. 5 3 In addition, facilities for these
offenders typically suffered from inadequate program
resources, resulting in no more than a virtual warehousing of
juveniles in facilities with all the worst characteristics of adult
245. Feld, Principleof Offense, supra note 240, at 849.
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731 (West 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 211.181 (Vernon 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.231 (Vernon 1983); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.353 (Anderson 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (Anderson Supp.
1991).
248. Feld, Principleof Offense, supra note 240, at 849.
249. Id. at 850-51.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 842.
252. Id. at 851.
253. Feld, Principleof Offense, supra note 240, at 895.
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penal incarceration.2 M
As in Washington, other states have cited the alleged failure of rehabilitative programs as a major reason for abandoning the individualized and indeterminate treatment
model." However, research indicates that the failure of treatment-model systems may have resulted from several causes.
Those causes include the following: (1) improper design of
juvenile facilities; (2) lack of adequate funding; (3) low community support; and (4) inadequate research about programs.2
To a large degree, juvenile facilities have always been
designed, first and foremost, to confine juveniles. Rehabilitative efforts have always been a secondary consideration.2 5 7
One commentator argues that the failure of the parens patriae
court occurred because states never provided adequate support
25 8
for either community or institutional treatment programs.
The result was a lack of coordination and money to create
effective programs. Other commentators place failure of
reform programs on a lack of solid research as to what is truly
effective in correcting delinquent behavior. 5 9
Programs may have failed to rehabilitate because they
were either ill-conceived or inadequately funded. Rather than
improve the rehabilitative system, critics jumped on the bandwagon to scrap it. 260 The experience of states that still
embrace some form of rehabilitative ideal calls into question
the wisdom of assuming that "nothing works" and shows that
critics were premature in their condemnation of treatment.
B.

The Experience of States That Treat Delinquency

The success of states that have retained a rehabilitative
treatment-oriented system demonstrates its advantages: lower
costs, lower recidivism rates, and decreased threats to public
safety. This subsection examines the juvenile justice system of
Alaska and Massachusetts as working examples of the treat254. Id.
255. Id

at 842-45.

256. Ferdinand, supra note 243, at 214-15.
257. Id. at 214-16. Professor Ferdinand contends that while state programs
focused on confinement, non-state programs were uncertain as to both funding and
continued existence. Because no state agency had the responsibility for treating
delinquents, no one developed administrative skill to create such programs. The end
result was that states became effective at confining but not at rehabilitating. Id.
258. Id. at 214.
259. Krisberg et al., supra note 211, at 30.
260. See generally id. at 28-30.
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ment model. The approaches to treatment taken in Utah,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland will add further evidence to the
success of treating rather than punishing juveniles.
Alaska remains one of the traditional "rehabilitative
states" with indeterminate sentencing. Delinquency dispositions are guided by considering the "best interests of the child"
and are indeterminate. 6 1 Upon a delinquency finding, a juvenile may be committed to the Department of Health and Social
Services for up to two years.2 62 In selecting a disposition, the
court is guided by a requirement that the disposition alternative be the least restrictive available. 6 3
Currently, judges in Alaska can choose from three disposition alternatives. The least restrictive alternative is "supervisory probation" where a juvenile is released to a parent or
guardian and supervised by a probation officer.264 Under
supervisory probation, legal custody remains with the parent,
but probation conditions include curfews, school attendance,
and participation in counseling. 2 5 The middle alternative is
"custodial probation" where the juvenile is committed to the
Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS). 26 The
juvenile may still be released to a parent, but the Department
retains authority to place the juvenile in a more restrictive
"nondetention setting" such as a foster home or group home.2 6 7
This placement decision is given to DHSS rather than to the
court. The most restrictive alternative is an institutional order
where the juvenile is placed in a correctional facility or detention center.2 6 With the exception of a two year limit, there is
no mandatory review of institutional placements.
While dispositions are to use the least restrictive alternative, Alaska ranks near the top of the list of states that institutionalize juvenile offenders. 6 9 This problem, however, can be
corrected as is demonstrated in Section IV.
Other states, such as Massachusetts, Maryland and Penn261. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.082 (1990).
262. Id. § 47.10.080(b)(1).
263. ALAsKA DEL. R. 11(e).
264. ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.080(b)(2) (1990).

265. Id.
266. Id. § 47.10.080(b)(3).
267. Id.
268. Id. § 47.10.080(b)(1).
269. Alaska ranked fourth highest in 1985 and fifth in 1987. The custody rate is
two to three times that of most northeastern states. Blair McCune, An Overview of
Juvenile Delinquency Law in Alaska, 8 ALASKA L. REv. 1, 6 n.26 (1991).
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sylvania, maintain a rehabilitative system with far greater success. Massachusetts is frequently referred to as the model for
a more humane system that does not compromise public
safety.27 0 Between 1970 and 1972, Massachusetts closed its
training schools and immediately moved to create communitybased alternatives. Although this resulted in a somewhat chaotic period, the community-based system remains in place
today. Of the 1,700 juveniles committed to the Division of
Youth Services in 1987-88, only ten percent were housed in
locked facilities. 271
Massachusetts' community-based programs characteristically have a juvenile population of six to twenty, group and
individual counseling, and a high staff to resident ratio. 2 Programs tend to last from four months to two years and transitions back to the community are planned. Caseworkers
continue to track former residents to ensure that they meet
school and work obligationsY 3
Massachusetts' success is strong proof that Washington
legislators should abandon the failing punitive system and
adopt a community-based treatment model. A 1989 study that
tracked eight hundred Massachusetts juveniles admitted and
released from the state's Division of Youth Services in 1984-85
concluded that those who continued to offend did so less frequently and the offenses were less serious." The study also
found that Massachusetts had a significantly lower recidivism
rate than other jurisdictions nationwide." S In addition, the
number of juvenile offenders who later found themselves in
the adult criminal system dropped from thirty-five percent to
fifteen percent between 1972 and 1985. 6 Finally, the juvenile
re-arrest rate was lower than the national average. 7
At the same time, there does not appear to be any objective study showing that public safety has been compromised.
In fact, compared to the "get tough" states like Washington,
the juvenile crime rate has dropped more substantially in Mas270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

STEVE LERNER, THE GOOD NEWS ABOUT JUVENILE JUSTICE 21-39 (1990).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-32.
Id. at 27.
LERNER, supra note 270, at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sachusetts. 27s Since 1975, Massachusetts' juvenile crime rate
has declined as much as, if not more than, the national average.279 There has been no serious crime wave as the result of
almost two decades of employing the treatment model.28 °
The Massachusetts experience directly contradicts the
belief of the Washington Juvenile Justice Act authors that
treatment fails. Further, the Massachusetts treatment model
met the goals that Washington hoped to achieve but did not
reach when Washington changed to a punitive system.
Pennsylvania, Utah, and Maryland have followed Massachusetts' model and have moved most of their juvenile delinquents into community-based facilities. These states provide
traditional rehabilitative programs.28 ' In these states, as in
Massachusetts, it is typical for a detailed treatment plan to be
developed based on the youth's background and for a social
and psychological evaluation to be conducted when a juvenile
is admitted to a community facility.28 2 Specific goals are established and juveniles are not released until the goals are met.28 3
In many programs, the average stay runs eight months to a
year.28 4 In addition, small populations and high staff to
resident ratios exist.28 5 In these states, as in Massachusetts,
recidivism rates are equal to or better than confinement
286
programs.
States, such as these, that have moved away from incarcer278. Thomas J. Bernard & Daniel Katkin, Introduction,8 LAW & POL'Y 391, 394
(1986).
279. Id.
280. Id. For additional background on the Massachusetts experience, see Bruce
Bullington et al., The Politics of Policy: Deinstitutionalizationin Massachusetts 19701985, 8 LAW & POL'Y 507 (1986); John A. Calhoun & Susan Wayne, Can the
Massachusetts Juvenile System Survive the Eighties?, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 522 (1981);
Franciszka A. Monarski, Rehabilitation vs. Punishment" A Comparative Analysis of
the Juvenile Justice Systems in Massachusetts and New York, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1091 (1987).
281. LERNER, supra note 270, at 41, 76-77, 96-98.
282. Id. at 44.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 85. Maryland's Thomas O'Farrell Youth Center is a typical example of
a program that lasts for six to nine months. Id. at 84-85.
285. LERNER, supra note 270, at 100-01. Utah's Deck Lake program is a typical
example in which a living unit consists of ten residents which allows for substantial
individual attention. Id.
286. A 1986 study in Utah found that 73 percent of juveniles placed in community
programs remained free of criminal convictions for twelve months following release
while 76 percent of those confined in secure facilities reoffended within a year of
release. Ferdinand, supra note 243, at 217.
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ating juveniles, share some common assumptions. Chief
among them is that large institutions are difficult to manage,
too violent, and produce high recidivism rates. 287 These states
have developed juvenile justice systems that work to rehabilitate juveniles, produce lower recidivism rates, and result in
commission of less serious offenses if the juvenile does reoffend.8 8 Correctional officials in these states also note that
there is no evidence the public is in any greater danger from
juveniles who participate in community-based programs.8 9
Massachusetts, Alaska, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Maryland
have achieved what Washington hoped to achieve in 1977 with
passage of the Juvenile Justice Act, and they succeeded with a
philosophy that Washington legislators abandoned as ineffective. These states prove that rehabilitation works and that
properly structured programs can protect public safety and
reduce juvenile crime at a cost far less than punitive justice.
C. The Choice of Treatment as a Preferred Option
Rehabilitation requires treatment of juveniles rather than
punishment. While some past studies have shown many rehabilitation programs to be ineffective, other studies have concluded that many juveniles benefit from treatment programs,
especially when assignment to a specific program is based on a
juvenile's identified needs.2 '0 Researchers have more recently
answered the question of whether anything works with a
"qualified yes," noting that a treatment model consisting of
counseling, therapy, and behavioral techniques has shown positive results.2 9 '
Treatment should be preferred over punishment for the
following reasons: (1) it places emphasis on the socioeconomic
factors that impact a juvenile's life; (2) it focuses on instilling
positive values in youth; (3) it provides an incentive to invest in
programs; and (4) it is at least as successful as a punitive system in deterring future crime.
287. LERNER, supra note 270, at 13.
288. Id. at 15.

289. Id. at 17. A 1987 study by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency
concluded that Utah's policy of community-based corrections did not worsen public
safety. Ira M. Schwartz et al., Business as Usual: Juvenile Justice During the 1980s, 5

NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 377, 392 (1991).
290. Ferdinand, supra note 243, at 213.
291. Joanna M. Basta & William S. Davidson II, Treatment of Juvenile Offenders:
Study Outcomes Since 1980, 6 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 355, 374 (1988).
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First, the proven success of community-based programs
indicates that a humane and effective juvenile justice system
must focus, to a substantial degree, on the socioeconomic background of a youth. The experience of King County, which continually has a juvenile arrest rate for violent crimes two to
four times higher than most counties, 292 suggests more attention should be paid to the nature of the offense and the juvenile's background. In King County, the school dropout rate is
22.3 percent, and of the ten Washington high schools with the
highest dropout rate, five are in Seattle. 9 3 About 52,000 of
King County households (8.6%) have incomes below the poverty level, 30,000 children live in families supported by public
assistance, and 10,000-20,000 people are homeless. 29 4 Family
violence is increasing." About 5,000 juveniles in King County
are reported annually as runaways:2 In 1988, it was estimated
that between 45,000 and 65,000 children suffered from emotional disturbance. Yet, in 1990, King County could only
accommodate 1,500 in its mental health programs."
The sale or use of drugs and alcohol stimulates an increasing number of gang-related crimes.298 In 1990, of the 3,348
preadjudicated youth admitted to the King County Detention
Center, forty-five percent were African-American and seventytwo percent had been in detention before. 2
In its 1991 report, the King County Children and Families
Task Force stated:
[T]he biggest underlying problem the County faces in helping its children and families is poverty. Increasing rates of
poverty are affecting more families, a problem that has a ripple effect. The deterioration of basic supports for children
and families contributes to the decline of mental and physical health for young people. The risks increase for youth
292. 1991 REPORT, Supra note 136, at 96.
293. KING COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMIuS TASK FORCE, PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE
FuruRE-A VISION FOR KING COUNTY's CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 26 (1991) [hereinafter
KING COUNTY TASK FORCE].

294. Id. at 9.
295. Id. at 30.
296. Id. at 17.
297. Id. at 11.
298. KING COUNTY TASK FORCE, supra note 293, at 15. Chemical dependency is
diagnosed in 67 percent of youth in the Department of Juvenile Rehabilitation. Fifty
percent of violent juvenile offenders report substance abuse to be a contributing factor

for their crimes Id.
299. Id.
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involvement in crime, drugs, alcohol, gangs, pregnancy, and
sexually transmitted diseases.
do not get the help they
If children and adolescents
°
need, these cycles continue.'
These grim facts and figures demonstrate that the social
and economic background of juveniles play a major role in
juvenile development and criminal behavior. Yet, the current
law in Washington forbids consideration of that background
when determining the fate of a juvenile offender."
King County's Prosecutor states that a "severe lack of sentencing options for less serious offenders represents a failure
to address the underlying reasons for youthful crime which
include poverty, sexual abuse, illiteracy, disintegrating families, drugs, gangs, and mental illness."' 2 For example, in King
County it is estimated that approximately seventy-two percent
of juveniles detained have drug or alcohol addictions while
more than sixty percent have mental health problems. 0 3
Fourteen of fifteen juveniles who committed murder in 1990
were either substance abusers or children of drug addicts and
alcoholics. °4
Shirley Hufstedler, former Secretary of Education, has
said, "It is futile to deny, and potentially dangerous, to fail to
acknowledge the connections between poverty, unemployment,
racism, and juvenile crime." 3 5 Further, she contends that
abandoning a rehabilitative model results in judges, social
workers, probation officers, and parents thinking so poorly of
themselves and the job they are trying to do that "almost any
hope for success is lost."'
Only a rehabilitative model that takes social and economic
factors into consideration and fashions a program to address
unmet needs can hope to break the cycle of poverty, lack of
education, and drug and alcohol abuse that leads to crime.
300. Id. at 44.
301. See supra notes 103, 129 and accompanying text.
302. Rothschild, supra note 177, at Al.
303. Id.
304. Kery Murakami, Kids Who Kill, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, WA),
Sept. 18, 1991, at A5.
305. Shirley Hufstedler, Should We Give Up Reform?, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 415,
417 (1984). See also LERNER, supra note 270, at 19 (asserting that those who attempt to
rehabilitate delinquents must inevitably confront a spectrum of social ills that
contribute to delinquency including poverty, the breakdown of the family, poor quality
schools, and the widespread use of drugs).
306. Hufstedler, supra note 305, at 420.
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Second, rehabilitative treatment instills positive values
into juveniles rather than reinforcing negative values. The
simple warehousing of youth not only fails to provide services
to break the cycle of crime, but also reinforces delinquent values and anti-social lifestyles. Exposing a juvenile to other
delinquent juveniles magnifies personality defects and teaches
the juvenile more serious criminal behavior. 0 7 If a juvenile
learns by example, does it make any sense to confine a juvenile
arrested for shoplifting in a facility with burglars, rapists, and
muggers? The juvenile will only learn how to be more delinquent. The existence of rehabilitative treatment programs can
counteract such negative impacts.
Third, rehabilitative programs require juveniles to invest
their time and energy toward a program's treatment objectives.
Whether a program will be effective in any system depends
upon the juvenile's incentive to participate in those programs.
Some juvenile court judges contend that juveniles have no
incentive to participate in programs when determinate
sentences are handed down.30 8 Participation in rehabilitative
programs requires effort. In a determinate system, a juvenile
will simply "do his or her time" and not participate in rehabilitative programs because the juvenile's release date is certain.
However, indeterminate sentences measure a juvenile's success
in treatment programs and provide incentive for juveniles to
become involved and to participate in such programs. 3°9
Fourth, a rehabilitative model reduces juvenile crime as
well as, if not better than, a punitive system. 310 Although
states that adopt a get-tough system do so, in part, to crack
down on crime, there appears to be no evidence in those states
that recidivism rates have declined. 31 1 Fulton County Juvenile
Court Judge Romae Powell notes that "advocates of determinate sentences have not proved that determinate sentences are
307. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 244, at 362.
308. Jeffrey E. Butler, A Study on the Issue of Indeterminate Versus Determinate

Sentencing, 30 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 39, 42-43 (1979).
309. Id.
310. LERNER, supra note 270, at 15.
311. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 244, at 359. Only one good study has been

undertaken and it focused on recidivism rates in Washington before and after the 1977
reform. The study concluded the change to a "just deserts" model of justice had not
impacted recidivism rates. Id. at 359. Despite implementation of longer incarceration
rates in California's system, recidivism rates increased. Id.

See also Krisberg et al.,

supra note 211, at 32 (finding no solid evidence that policies of increased juvenile
incapacitation positively affect public safety).
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more effective or have a more deterrent's12effect on an offender
as opposed to indeterminate sentences.
A recent Washington study has suggested that this state's
system of determinate sentences may have a deterrent
effect. 31 3 The study analyzed the criminal careers of 926 male
juvenile offenders who were released from the Division of
Juvenile Rehabilitation in 1982. The study concluded that confinement has a significant effect because juveniles averaged 4.4
offenses per year before confinement and 0.6 offenses while
confined. 14 The result is not surprising because most inmates
have limited freedom in confinement settings. The comparison
is not useful.
The study also alleged that confinement does rehabilitate.
This result is based on both post-release offenders that averaged 1.1 crime per year during the six and a half years after
release, and on the fact that forty percent of offenders committed Class B + or higher offenses prior to confinement whereas
only twenty-three percent committed these offenses after
release.31 5 This alleged success must be tempered because
eighty percent of the offenders committed some offense within
six and a half years after release; two thirds were convicted of
felonies, and forty percent were returned to confinement during the followup period. 16 More than fifty percent were convicted of a new offense within a year of release, and more than
two thirds were reconvicted within two years.3 1 7
The study suffered from two other significant weaknesses
in trying to demonstrate that confinement positively impacts
juveniles. First, the study did not include either post-release
criminal convictions outside of Washington State or postrelease offenses that did not result in arrest and conviction.
Therefore, there is an incomplete picture of how many new
offenses were actually committed by released offenders. Second, these juveniles were confined in Division facilities in 1982.
In the decade since 1982, the condition of facilities in Washing312. Romae T. Powell, Disposition Concepts, 34 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 4 (1983).
313. JOHN C. STEIGER & CARY DIZON, REHABILITATION, RELEASE AND
REOFFENDING:

A REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CAREER OF THE DIVISION OF JUVENILE

REHABILITATION "CLASS OF 1982," Department of Social and Health Services (May
1991).
314. Id. at 22.
315. Id. at 9.

316. Id.
317. Id.
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ton has deteriorated, and incarcerated juveniles are more dangerous and violent. Therefore, it is difficult to compare the
rehabilitative effect of 1982 confinement with 1992 confinement. The average age at release was sixteen, and given the
accepted notion that delinquent acts often decrease with age,"'8
the alleged decline in the number of offenses of confined youth
may be attributable to maturation rather than confinement.
The apparent intent of this state study was to show that
Washington's punitive system compares favorably to the experience of states like Massachusetts. However, even those who
contend that community treatment programs are not more
effective than incarceration admit that such programs are at
least as effective in combatting juvenile crime and considerably
3 19

less costly.

The debate between punishment and rehabilitation often
focuses on extremes. Traditionally, the two concepts have
been mutually exclusive. Rather than adopt either extreme, a
better approach is to incorporate the punishment of juveniles
with substantially more rehabilitation so that an offender can
be returned to the community to live in a productive manner.
In the long run, rehabilitation must be the goal. Judge Wright
3 20
stated in U.S. v. Bland:
fTjhere is no denying the fact that we cannot write these
children off forever. Some day they will grow up and at
some point they will have to be freed from incarceration....
[T]he kind of society we have in years to come will 3 in
no
21
small measure depend on our treatment of them now.
The choice is whether we want juvenile delinquents
returned to the community in the same, or worse, condition as
when they were found delinquent or whether we want to rehabilitate juveniles with skills that they may use to obtain a job
and to live without resorting to crime.
Finally, rehabilitation should not be abandoned in favor of
punishment because of the longstanding legal tradition and
social recognition that juveniles are different than adults. The
Supreme Court stated the following in Thompson v.
318. Anna Louise Simpson, Comment, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a
Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CAL. L. REv. 984 (1976).
319. See Don C. Gibbons, Juvenile Delinquency: Can Social Science Find a Cure?,

32 CPaME & DELINQ. 186 (1986).
320. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
321. Id. at 1349 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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Oklahoma:322
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make a
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her
conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt
to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an
adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the
privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why
their irresponsible conduct is not as morally responsible as
that of an adult.3 23
We must continue, as a society, to be optimistic that
today's youth will grow into tomorrow's responsible adult citizen. Society must assist to provide the experience and the education that juveniles require so that they can ultimately make
mature, responsible decisions as adults. Punishment fails to
fulfill that duty. A punitive juvenile justice system merely
warehouses youth without providing necessary social skills. By
structuring programs that address each individual juvenile's
social needs and instill positive social values, and by encouraging juveniles to invest in such programs through disposition
incentives such as early release, juvenile crime can be effectively reduced at a lower cost.
V.

TOWARD A REHABILITATED JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

The failure of Washington's punitive juvenile justice system, in contrast with the success of rehabilitative communitybased programs in other states, demands that legislators abandon much of the system enacted in 1977 and implement a new
system that emphasizes rehabilitative principles. The following recommendations would serve to implement that goal.
A.

Rewrite Provisionsof the Juvenile Justice Act to Ensure
that the Ideal of Rehabilitation is at Least Equal If Not
Paramountto the Ideal of Holding Juveniles Accountable in
3 "4
DispositionProceedings

Professionals who deal with the current system acknowledge that the state went too far by treating juveniles the same
322. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
323. Id. at 835.
324. The 1992 legislature inserted intent language to the purposes section of the
law, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010 (West 1992), stating that all stated purposes of

the Act were equally important, but the legislature failed to address any substantive
provisions that would demonstrate that intent in the working of the law.
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as adults, and that in either system, determinate or indeterminate, a juvenile's social and economic background must be considered in fashioning a disposition that will minimize future
criminal behavior. 325 As noted previously, those dealing with
juvenile offenders recognize that repeat juvenile offenders
often have a history of family problems, and that a punitive
system does not guarantee community protection.3 26
Rewriting the law to specifically require dispositions to
consider a juvenile's social and economic background is essential to transform our punitive system into one that focuses on
rehabilitation. Among the provisions that should be rewritten
are those that define the purposes of the juvenile justice system, 327 that prohibit the court from considering gender, ethnic,
32
social and economic factors,
3 29
ranges.
outside established

and that provide sentences

B. Formalize and Limit Diversion Proceedings
While initially this proposal may seem more punitive than
rehabilitative, in actual practice the result will be to provide
treatment services for a juvenile at an earlier stage in his or
her potential criminal career, and, thus, will avoid the harsh
consequences of confinement.
When juveniles are brought before a judge at the initial
referral, future outcomes are more positive.3 30 Judges who
face juvenile offenders believe that even brief appearances
reinforce the message that the community will not tolerate
juvenile crime.33 ' Yet, the current law allows juveniles to
avoid formal adjudication numerous times through informal
diversion. 3 2 Some judges assert that overworked prosecutors
may informally divert a juvenile as many as eight times,
thereby depriving youthful offenders from any sense of
325. John Gillie, Kids Who Kill, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, WA), Sept. 18,
1991, at A4.
326. JUVENILE LAW REPORT, supra note 231, at 3. See also Hufstedler, supra note
305, at 420; Rothschild, supra note 177, at Al.
327. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010 (West 1992).
328. Id. § 13.40.150(4).
329. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
330. Waln K. Brown et al., The FavorableEffect of Juvenile Court Adjudication of

Delinquent Youth on the First Contact With the Juvenile Justice System, 38 FAM. &
Cr. J. 21, 25-26 (1987).
331. JUvENILE LAW REPORT, supra note 231, at 3.
332. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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accountability."' 3 A court appearance should be required
whenever possible to approve a diversion agreement for firsttime offenders.
The present use of diversion is one area of the current law
where more punitive justice is warranted. Diversion should be
limited in order to prevent offenders from getting off too easily
or from getting off without sufficient corrective treatment.
Diversion agreements should not be allowed for most felony
offenders and should be restricted to no more than two per
youth.3Under amendments enacted in 1992, diversion agreements
are limited to ten hours of counseling and twenty hours of
information sessions at community agencies. a Because many
criminal acts may result from long-term family and personal
issues, the law should not assume that these problems can be
reduced by minimal counseling. Counseling requirements
should be significantly increased. In the alternative, judges
should be given greater discretion to provide for a juvenile's
rehabilitative needs through diversion.
The use of diversion was the one area in which the 1992
legislature made the substantive changes recommended by the
Juvenile Issues Task Force and was not vetoed. Under the
new law, diversion is not allowed for class C felonies that are
considered crimes against the person or for alleged offenders
who have been previously committed to the Department of
Social and Health Services." s However, despite these changes,
diversion requires additional reform in order to ensure effective intervention before the number and severity of a juvenile's
crimes escalates.
C. Replace the FormalisticSentencing Point Structure With
an Indeterminate Sentencing System
Under the current system, many juveniles take the risk
inherent in criminal activity because they are aware that they
will either be diverted or that they will face relatively short
confinement terms during which nothing will be expected of
333. Epler, Growing Up Violent, supra note 221, at Al.
334. Current law prohibits diversion of a youth who has had three diversions.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.070(5)(d) (West 1992), as amended by H.B. 2466, 52d
Leg., 1992 Reg. Sess., 1992 Wash Laws ch. 205.
335. Id. § 13.40.080(2)(c) (West 1992). Prior law limited counseling to two hours
and educational sessions to ten hours.
336. Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, ch. 205, 1992 Wash Laws 886.
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them. 3 7 Some recommend that widening sentencing ranges
In fact, the 1992 legislature
will resolve the problem.3s
attempted to widen sentencing ranges, but the effort was
vetoed.33 9 However, the proposed solution of widening sentencing ranges presupposes that the current, formalistic disposition scheme, which bases "sentences" solely on a juvenile's
age and offense history, is compatible with operation of a treatment model of justice. They are, to a large degree, not compatible. Making a punitive system that has failed to reduce
juvenile crime even more punitive is not an appropriate
solution.
Determinate sentencing of juveniles should be replaced by
a primarily indeterminate scheme for three reasons. First,
merely increasing the punitive nature of the current system
will not result in greater crime reduction. Second, age alone is
an insufficient basis on which to base a disposition. Third, the
current system allows too many offenses to accumulate before
any significant intervention takes place.
In regard to crime reduction, one of the drawbacks of
increasing the potential length of punishment is that punishment, by itself, does not necessarily rehabilitate or deter.
Rather, the deterrent effect of punishment results from certainty that sanctions will be imposed and not from the potential severity of the sanctions.3 °
In regard to the use of age as a factor in establishing a sentence, the existing sentencing scheme is fundamentally flawed
because it relies on age as a primary factor that increases sanctions. Many believe that delinquency is a symptom of adolescence and a symptom that is generally outgrown.3 1 The
justification in Washington law for punishing older juveniles
more severely is that they are more culpable and should be
337. JUVENILE LAW REPORT, supra note 231, at 2.

338. Id.
339. Veto Letter, supra note 228. The legislature proposed increasing the length
of community supervision for all first/minor and middle offenders to twelve months
and increasing possible confinement terms for low.range middle offenders. In his
letter, Governor Gardner vetoed the proposals because he believed that they would
result in significant caseload increases for detention facilities. He noted the fiscal

impact of community service increases alone was eleven million dollars with similar
increases for added confinement. Governor Gardner also said that local governments
lack physical space to house offenders for longer terms and a critical overcrowding
crisis already exists. Approval of this section of the bill would only have added to the
crisis according to the Governor. Id.
340. Gardner, supra note 244, at 143.
341. Id.
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held more accountable than younger offenders.-42 Under the
formalistic grid, where a thirteen-year-old and a seventeenyear-old have the same criminal history, the older offender,
who is more likely to terminate delinquent behavior sooner,
will be subjected to longer terms of confinement, community
service, and supervision than a younger offender who is theoretically more likely to commit additional offenses. The system appears backward because it places more emphasis and
resources on those who are less likely to reoffend. This seemingly backward result epitomizes the punitive nature of Washington's system. Further, the current system does little to
either hold like offenders similarly accountable, or to address
the needs of those in need of rehabilitation, or to protect the
community because the person most likely to reoffend gets the
most lenient treatment.
Additionally, as mentioned in the context of diversion, the
current system allows a juvenile to accumulate too many serious offenses before significant intervention begins. Not only is
significant criminal activity required before the state will even
consider confinement, community supervision for minor and
middle offenders is limited to one year. Only the most serious
offenders in those categories face the maximum penalty. 43
Juvenile court judges are also extremely limited
in the requirements that they can impose as part of
supervision.'*
Moreover, the lack of significant early intervention leads
to more serious crime as explified by one recent crime in
Washington. A sixteen-year-old currently charged with committing a vicious murder in Washington had a prior arrest record for burglary, shoplifting, assault, malicious mischief, and
criminal trespassing, yet was never formally charged for any of
these crimes. 4 5 The accumulation of numerous escalating
charges suggests a serious predisposition to criminal activity
that deserves investigation. Had the state become actively
involved anywhere during the accumulation of the charges, it
is likely that the reasons for this youth's escalating criminal
behavior could have been identified and positively addressed.
With proper treatment of the individual or adequate provision
342. DISPOSITION STANDARDS GUIDE, supra note 81, at 15-16.
343. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 119.

345. Christy Scattarella & Duff Wilson, A Murder in Orting, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1991, at Al.
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of services to address that person's needs, the ultimate act of
murder might have been avoided.
Of the fifteen juvenile murderers charged in 1990, twelve
had prior criminal records and fourteen had significant school
problems. 4
The fact that fifteen- to seventeen-year-olds
account for more property and violent crimes than any other
juvenile age group,- 7 and that juveniles now in confinement
have histories of multiple offenses, indicate that these
juveniles are not being adequately rehabilitated."48
Dispositions must be based on more than the age and
offense history of a juvenile. Juvenile and family court judges
across the country recognize that while current and prior criminal history are important considerations in fashioning a disposition, the needs, circumstances, and problems of individual
offenders vary and require judicial flexibility. 4 9 The question
then becomes how much flexibility is desired. Alaska's concept of three basic alternatives is a good model and should be
followed as a starting point to define an alternative structure
for Washington State." ° With a mandate that the least restrictive alternative available be utilized, judges should have the
following disposition options: (1) a broad supervision order; (2)
a community placement order; and (3) a commitment order. 3 l
Under the first option, a "supervision order," a judge would
place a youth on probation for supervision by the Division of
Juvenile Rehabilitation (the "Division") for up to one year.
The juvenile's family would retain custody of the juvenile during supervision. The order would impose requirements such as
a curfew, counseling, restitution, community service, school
346. Patti Epler, Breaking the Cycle, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, WA),
Sept. 18, 1991, at Al. [hereinafter Epler, Breaking the Cycle].
347. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
348. For stories of juveniles who committed numerous offenses before the system
caught up with them, see Rick Anderson, Juvenile Court: Where the Numbers Don't
Always Add Up, SEATLE TIMES, Mar. 22, 1991, at El; Epler, Breaking the Cycle, supra
note 346, at Al; Kate Shatzkin, Taking the Wrong Road, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992,
at Al.

349. The Juvenile Court and Serious Offenders: 38 Recommendations, Juv. &
FAM. CT. J. 9 (Summer 1984) [hereinafter Serious Offenders]. In a series of
recommendations adopted in July 1984, the National Council of Juvenile and Family

Court Judges endorsed individualized

treatment of offenders and the goal of

rehabilitation as the primary focus of the juvenile court.

Id.

350. In fact, the King County Department of Youth Services has proposed a plan
similar to that of Alaska. See supra note 238.

351. This three-tiered proposal is modeled after Alaska's system explained supra
notes 261-68 and accompanying text.
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attendance, employment, and other services designed to meet a
juvenile's specific needs. The Division could terminate the
supervision order at any time. If the juvenile violates the conditions of the order, the Division could petition the court for
more severe sanctions, such as the placement in a state or
county-operated facility.
The second option, a "placement order," would function
similarly to Alaska's "custodial probation." A placement order
would commit a juvenile to the Division for an indeterminate
period between six months and one year. The juvenile could
still reside with the family, but, as a provision of the court's
disposition order, the Division would have authority to place
the juvenile in a non-detention residential setting without an
additional hearing if it became necessary to achieve compliance
with probation requirements.
The third alternative of the court, a "commitment order,"
would only be used when required for community protection
and when less restrictive alternatives would fail to rehabilitate.
Commitment orders would be for a minimum of nine months
and a maximum of eighteen months. To maintain a measure
of accountability on the juvenile, judges should have the ability
to set longer determinate sentences based on aggravating factors such as a history of offending, extreme seriousness or
viciousness of crimes involving persons, or use of a weapon.
Nevertheless, to ensure fair treatment, the juvenile should
have a mechanism to seek earlier release if he or she can show
that he or she is sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant release to
a less restrictive alternative.
As part of the third alternative, judges should also be
given the option to provide a deferred imposition of sentence
that would allow a judge to order confinement only if a juvenile fails to comply with custodial probation requirements. In
effect, a judge would commit a youth to confinement, but the
youth would be allowed to participate in a non-detention residential setting. If the juvenile failed to fulfill court mandated
placement requirements, the Division could immediately confine the juvenile for the duration of the sentence and petition
the court for a formal modification of the placement order.
This three-tiered system includes several layers of rehabilitative settings with various degrees of restrictiveness. Alaska
has maintained a high rate of confinement under its threetiered system. The high confinement rate is likely due in large
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part to a lack of less restrictive alternatives. To realize the
benefits of Alaska's system, while avoiding the pitfalls, sufficient alternatives must be created. Additionally, while Alaska
allows commitment in increments of two year periods, it is recommended that for placement orders, Washington adopt a one
year maximum term that may be extended on petition of the
court. Further, for any juvenile in placement, a court review
should be held every six months to determine if ongoing placement is required. Juveniles who are under commitment orders
should also be afforded either a periodic, mandatory court
review or a parole board hearing. As an option, the law might
allow for a juvenile, parent, or guardian to petition the court
for a limited periodic review of commitment.
Periodic review requirements are intended to help ensure
that a juvenile does not become lost in the system or that a
juvenile is not removed from his or her family any longer than
necessary. While the plan suggested by this Comment is somewhat similar to the paternalistic juvenile courts created by the
Progressive movement, these reviews will provide a check and
balance to the unbridled discretion that marked the functioning of the Progressive courts. By providing shorter commitment terms than Alaska, and by requiring periodic reviews, it
is hoped that the drawback of Alaska's system, too many
juveniles being retained in the system for too long, can be
avoided.
The six- and nine-month time frames for minimum initial
placement or commitment are recommended because the experience of states that utilize rehabilitative programs consistently
indicates that six to twelve months are required to produce
positive effects.3 5 2 Under Washington's current juvenile justice
philosophy, this type of disposition plan would not be compatible or effective because a juvenile's average length of stay in
detention is less than nine days 35 3 and because a juvenile's
detention time prior to adjudication is subtracted from disposition time.'
Because rehabilitation is unlikely in pre-adjudication detention, and because post-adjudication confinement or
community supervision in many cases is significantly less than
a year, Washington's current sentencing scheme reduces the
352. LERNER, supra note 270, at 27-32.

353. Rothschild, supra note 177, at Al. As many as 60 percent of youth detained
are held no more than 72 hours. Id.
354. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.210 (West 1992); In Re Trambitas, 96 Wash. 2d
329, 635 P.2d 122 (1981).
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amount of time in which any corrective efforts may be
employed, further weakening the system's potential rehabilitative effect.
In summary, while professionals recognize that Washington's current juvenile justice system needs to emphasize rehabilitation, 5 maintaining the current disposition scheme is
incompatible with the goal of rehabilitation. In light of the
serious lack of adequate resources, the existing system's reliance on age as a sentencing factor, large institutions, and the
complicated point system, a juvenile is only assured to receive
a few ineffective programs in settings that are not conducive to
rehabilitation and for periods that are too short to achieve lasting results.
A system that provides judges greater flexibility will allow
judges to address a juvenile's specific needs in the least restrictive manner. Indeterminate sentences keep juveniles guessing
as to how long they may be incarcerated. Indeterminacy provides less incentive for juveniles to engage in crime because
they know that they could be retained in a correctional facility
longer than the current sentencing guidelines permit. Indeterminacy will also provide a greater incentive for youth to
engage in rehabilitative programs because positive performance may result in early release.
D. Provide Judges With DispositionAlternatives Other
Than Confinement, Including Expanded Use of
Community Supervision
In crafting dispositions, the Juvenile Disposition Standards
Commission is concerned only with the term of confinement to
be imposed and not with the nature of security imposed.3
Yet, professionals who work with juvenile offenders believe
that many juvenile offenders do not need incarceration as
much as they need to be removed from their environment.3 5 7
Removing a juvenile from his or her environment under the
existing law means confinement in detention facilities that
have been shown to be detrimental to juveniles.
The current law should be amended to redefine the definitions and requirements for confinement, community supervision, and probation. Because the Commission does not
355. See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
356. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.030(l)(a) (West 1992).
357. Rothschild, supra note 177, at Al.
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consider the nature of security, more discretion must be given
to the court or to the Division.
Under the current law, the definition of "confinement" is
narrow and the definition limits placement to detention centers and institutions."' 8 The definition of confinement should
be expanded to include placement in residential facilities and
also to include other alternatives, such as electronic home confinement. This change is necessary to provide the variety of
less restrictive placement options urged as part of an indeterminate disposition approach."5 9
If some version of the current point system is retained,
community supervision terms should be lengthened for all
minor and middle offenders in order to provide for up to one
year of supervision for any offense. This allows a necessary
and sufficient period of time for the Division to assess whether
rehabilitative efforts are having a positive effect. The definition of community supervision should also be expanded to
allow referral to community counseling programs so that a
juvenile receives sufficient and appropriate counseling to
address the reasons for criminal behavior s '
Following confinement, the current law requires that a
youth be placed on probation for up to eighteen months.3 6 '
The law should be amended to include a minimum term of at
least one year and also to allow for probation until age twentyone, even if more than eighteen months are required.
Extended probation would ensure that juveniles complete any
long-term community-based treatment programs required as a
part of probation. At the same time, the state should develop a
thorough program of aftercare services to monitor a juvenile's
activity in the community. Juvenile court judges note that
returning juveniles to the community "cold turkey" without
reintegration support often causes those juveniles who have
made gains in residential placement to "wash out" upon return
358. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.020(4) (West 1992) (defining
"confinement").
359. The legislature attempted these changes but the effort was vetoed. H.B. 2466,
52d Leg., Reg. Sess., 1992 Wash Laws 886. See also Veto Letter, supra note 229.
360. This effort was also made by the 1992 legislature and vetoed. Governor
Gardner stated that the expanded definition of "community-based rehabilitation could
result in placing youths in residential or substance abuse programs as a condition of
their sentence thus limiting a juvenile's liberty without adequate due process as
required by involuntary civil commitment statutes." Veto Letter, supra note 228.
361. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.210(3) (West 1992).

456

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 16:399

to the community.3 6 2 The states that are the most successful
with community-based services and the prevention of recidivism have intensive aftercare programs. 363
E. Begin to Immediately Replace the InstitutionalSystem
With Smaller, Community-Based Facilities
The success of rehabilitative juvenile justice in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Maryland demonstrates that a
rehabilitative system would benefit the State of Washington.
When properly staffed and adequately funded, communitybased programs that "rehabilitate" juvenile delinquents are
less expensive, more humane, more protective of public safety,
and at least as effective as a punitive system, if not better, in
reducing recidivism. Community-based systems keep juveniles
closer to their families, and increased contact between youth
and family enhances the chances for reintegrating the youth
3
into the family. 1
Community-based detention is the stated and ultimate goal
of the Division of Juvenile Rehabilitation.'
However, previous efforts to establish community group homes met with
neighborhood reaction so hostile that King County officials
have given up on the concept. 3 " As a compromise, the Division's seven year plan now calls for both maintaining and
upgrading existing institutions while moving toward placement in smaller community settings. 7 The compromise
should be re-examined. In a dual goal system, scarce financial
resources that could go toward creating a more cost effective
community system will end up being directed toward existing
institutions because that is where the juveniles are now. The
idea of a community-based system will die before it is ever
given life.
The need to shift to community-based settings was recognized by the 1991 Juvenile Issues Task Force, which recommended that the state be instructed to plan to reduce reliance
362. Serious Offenders, supra note 349, at 17.
363. LERNER, supra note 270, at 14.
364. DIVISION OF JUVENILE REHABILITATION,

STRATEGIC PLAN 1987-1993, at 12

(1987).
365. Constantine Angelos, Council Pushes Change for Juvenile Centers, SEATLE
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1990, at B3.

366. Rothschild, supra note 177, at Al.
367. Angelos, supra note 365, at B3.
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The Task Force stated that
of large institutional facilities.'
the state should expedite implementation of a switch to
smaller community facilities and programs by incorporating
the concept into the planning for the fiscal year 1993-95
budget." 9 The task force recommendation was incorporated
into but later stripped from legislation passed by the 1992
legislature. °
The Division should direct greater effort toward creating a
rehabilitative community-based system that advocates contend
will improve the juveniles' lives, reduce the cost of maintaining
large institutions, and avoid potential court intervention
against the existing state system. 1 Of all the placement
options available for youth, placement in secure facilities
should be limited to fifteen percent of the total number of
juveniles adjudicated delinquent, a ratio that other states have
found satisfactory to deal with those juveniles who cannot be
placed in the community. 7 2
For fundamental change to occur in both the sentencing of
juveniles and the delivery of rehabilitative services, the public
must be closely involved. The Division should begin to involve
the public in planning a "rehabilitative" community-based
juvenile system and to educate the public about the financial
and social benefits of such a system.
F.

The State Must Make an Adequate FinancialCommitment
If a Truly RehabilitativeIdeal is Ever to Be
Achieved

In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, where the
success of a community-based model has been achieved, a key
factor has been financial resources. 73 Funding once directed
to institutions was directed to the community to provide youth
services and protection. 7 4
The result in Massachusetts has been cost effective. The
368. 1992 Legislative Package 7 (as voted upon at the Dec. 16, 1991, Juvenile Issues

Task Force Meeting).
369. Id.
370. Barbara A. Serrano, Weakened Juvenile Justice Bill OK'd, SEATTLE TIMES,

Mar. 12, 1992, at BI.
371. Id. See also KING COuNTY TASK FORCE, supra note 293, at 19.

372. See LEiNEM, supra note 270.
373. Id.
374. Vincent Schiraldi, Hawaii'sJuvenile Justice System:"A Model for Reform, 54
FED. PROBATION 58, 59 (1990).
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annual cost per child in the Massachusetts Department of
Youth Services averages $23,000 compared to $35,000-$40,000
reported in many other states. 7 5 In Utah, the communitybased system initially required a budget $250,000 less than the
old custodial-based system. 76 A 1987 study indicated that
Utah's system saved taxpayers $30 million in capital costs and
$10 million in annual operating costs.

377

The recommendations of this Comment to reform the
juvenile justice system in Washington are predicated on the
assumption that adequate funding will be available, an assumption that may be too much to expect. The 1990 budget shortfall
of $750 million was the state's worst fiscal crisis in a decade.
While legislators survived that crisis, a budget deficit of $500
million is predicted for 1993.378

Considering the budget crisis Washington faces, it may be
unrealistic to presume that a rehabilitative juvenile justice system, as urged both in this Comment and by many who have
testified to the Juvenile Issues Task Force, is capable of being
effectively inaugurated.3 7 ' The other options are to leave the
system as it is, an option that has significant problems, or to
abolish the juvenile court system as we know it, an option
many commentators have recommended. 3 0 Those who advocate abolition argue that the current system, whether determinate or indeterminate, fails to provide adequate procedural due
process while also subjecting juveniles to the loss of liberty
with no correlative rehabilitative effect.38 1
If Washington legislators are unwilling to provide funding
necessary to provide adequate and effective educational, counseling, and vocational services that will truly rehabilitate, then
375. Ferdinand, supra note 243, at 216.
376. Id.
377. Schwartz et al., supra note 289, at 392.
378. Jim Simon, Gardner Vetoes Boost Aid for Young, Environment, SEATTLE

TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at B2, col. 3.
379. The 1992 legislation almost failed to pass because critics argued that the
legislature was setting new policies without any money to back them up. Senator Cliff
Bailey, one of five senators filing protest votes against the bill said, "It's an empty
promise ....
If we feel strongly enough about these juvenile justice programs... then
we ought to provide funding." Serrano, supra note 370, at B1. Ultimately, many

portions of the bill were vetoed because they lacked funding. See supra note 228 and
accompanying text.
380. See Ainsworth, supra note 82; Feld, Principleof Offense, supra note 240.
381. See Ainsworth, supra note 82, at 1119-21; Feld, Principle of Offense, supra
note 241; but see Forst & Blomquist, supra note 244; H. Ted Rubin, Retain the Juvenile
Court?,25 CRIME & DELiNQ. 281 (1979).
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the system argued for in this Comment should also be discarded in favor of a typical criminal court in which juveniles
are afforded all the procedural due process provided in adult
criminal courts.
The preferable option, though, is to employ a rehabilitative juvenile justice system because the number of juveniles
who will be entering the "at-risk" years for committing
offenses will increase during this decade. 8 2 The many reasons
for a rehabilitative system can be summed up by quoting from
a recent editorial: "If we fail to do a better job of preventing
youngsters from falling into the abyss of abuse, neglect, crime
and substance abuse and of rescuing those already there, soci'3
ety will pay a frightful price. 1
VI. CONCLUSION
Washington's 1977 Juvenile Justice Act was hailed by
some political leaders as a "model for the rest of the nation in
its approach to juvenile crime."''
Soon after its implementation, one of the bill's prime sponsors conceded that the potential accomplishments of the law would take time to measure,
and that, in the meantime, researchers would analyze the system until the time comes when "our thinking about crime and
children and families undergoes another revolution. '38 5 That
time is now.
When Washington "revolutionized" its juvenile justice system in 1977, proponents warned that it would be too much to
expect that the legislation would dramatically reduce juvenile
crime or provide instant solutions to family crises. s86 Legislators did hope that the 1977 Act might make the system more
rational and fair, and that it would reduce expensive and inappropriate incarceration of children. s 7
After fourteen years of experience it is evident that the
Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, enacted to hold youth accountable, to reduce a growing juvenile crime rate, and to get a handle on the cost of dealing with juvenile offenders, has failed to
382. 1991 REPORT, supra note 136, at 45. The number of youth between the ages of
ten to seventeen is predicted to increase by approximately 82,000 from 1990 to 2000.
383. Juvenile Justice Poses Challenge, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 29,
1991, at D2.
384. Becker, supra note 54, at 310-11.
385. Id. at 311.
386. Id. at 312.
387. Id.
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achieve those goals. Violent juvenile crime continues to escalate.3 s8 Washington remains near the top of the list of states in
its rate of juvenile incarceration. 389 Juvenile detention facilities are plagued by overcrowding, lack of treatment services,
and violence. Juveniles with extensive criminal records or substantial emotional problems are diverted from formal sanctions. A system built largely on the premise and the promise
of accountability has neither made many juveniles accountable
for their crimes nor held juveniles accountable to a public that
remains unprotected from crime.
The solution is the infusion into our punitive system of
rehabilitative ideals that were first espoused when the juvenile
justice system was created. The success of other states that
have moved away from secure confinement of juveniles in
large institutions to small community-based, non-secure programs demonstrates there is a better way to treat juveniles; a
way that will be more cost effective, humane, and protective of
society and that will also be fair and hold juveniles accountable
for their acts. With many procedural safeguards now in place
and the existence of effective treatment programs, a juvenile
no longer must be condemned to suffer the worst of both
worlds as Gerald Gault nearly experienced. 390
It may appear that the system advocated in this Comment
rejects punitive juvenile justice in favor of a full-fledged return
to rehabilitation. However, for the true believers of the "just
deserts" model of justice, the punitive nature remains in the
potential imposition of fines, restitution, and confinement, as
well as restrictions on liberty that may be imposed. Waiver to
adult court, a highly punitive sanction, would still loom for the
most heinous of juvenile offenders under the proposed system.
To enact an improved juvenile justice system in Washington will require a financial commitment. No amount of statutory amendment and no amount of judicial rhetoric will turn a
punitive system into a rehabilitative one. The services and programs must accompany the desire to improve juvenile justice.
It is a financial commitment we can choose to make now or it
is one we will likely be forced to make in the future.
While pushing for a punitive juvenile justice system in
Washington, State Representative Mary Kay Becker noted that
388. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
390. See supra part II.B.
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the ultimate answer to juvenile crime did not lie with any law,
and that it was for parents, schools, churches, employers, and
the rest of the community to set higher standards and to create
an environment to challenge juveniles to give their best. 39 1
The adoption of the system advocated in this Comment will
help set those standards and provide that environment.
In planning for the future, we have only the lessons of the
past from which to learn. In shaping the future of the juvenile
justice system in Washington, the words written more than
eighty years ago by Professor Julian Mack are still admirable
and express the goal that we, as a society, must continue to
strive to achieve, for it is our very future that is at stake:
[T]he work of the juvenile court is, at the best, palliative,
curative. The more important, indeed the vital thing, is to
prevent the children from reaching that condition in which
they have to be dealt with in any court, and we are not doing
our duty to the children of to-day [sic], the men and women
of to-morrow [sic], when we neglect to destroy the evils that
are leading them into careers of delinquency, when we fail
not merely to uproot the wrong, but to implant in place of it
the positive good. The work demands the united and
aroused efforts of the whole community, bent on keeping
children from becoming criminals, determined that those
who are treading the downward path shall be halted and led
back.39 2

391. Becker, supra note 54, at 312.
392. Mack, supra note 13, at 122.

